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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL BOARD MEMBERS IN THE INTEGRATION 
OF NOCs INTO THE GLOBAL MARKET: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
SAUDI ARAMCO AND EQUINOR  
 
 
 
NESLİHAN SAYDAM 
 
CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
 
Keywords: Global oil market, NOCs, Board of directors, International board members, 
Market integration 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to find the relationship between the change in the level of 
integration of NOCs into the global oil market and change in the number of international 
members on their board. The thesis is based on the hypothesis that the decision of a NOC 
to be more integrated into the market, and its attempts in this way, creates an increase in 
the number of international members on the board of the company. The hypothesis of the 
thesis is generated based on the extensive literature on NOCs and Board of Directors. The 
methodology used in testing the hypothesis is the most different systems design (MDSD). 
A comparison is made between Saudi Aramco and Equinor, which are two cases that fit 
to the application of MDSD. The result of the comparison indicates that there is a 
correlation between the change in the level of integration of NOCs into the global oil 
market and change in the number of international board members. Thus, this finding 
verifies the hypothesis. 
 
  
 v 
ÖZET 
 
 
 
ULUSAL PETROL ŞİRKETLERİNİN KÜRESEL MARKETE 
ENTEGRASYONUNDA YABANCI UYRUKLU KURUL ÜYELERİNİN ROLÜ: 
SAUDI ARAMCO VE EQUINOR KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ 
 
 
 
NESLİHAN SAYDAM 
 
UYUŞMAZLIK ANALİZİ VE ÇÖZÜMÜ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Küresel Petrol Piyasası, Ulusal Petrol Şirketleri, Yönetim Kurulu, 
Yabancı Uyruklu Kurul Üyeleri, Market Entegrasyonu 
 
 
Bu tezin amacı, ulusal petrol şirketlerinin küresel petrol piyasasına entegrasyon 
düzeyindeki değişim ile bu şirketlerin yönetim kurulundaki uluslararası üye sayısındaki 
değişim arasındaki ilişkiyi bulmaktır. Bu tez, ulusal petrol şirketlerinin küresel market 
entegrasyonlarını artırma kararlarının yabancı uyruklu yönetim kurulu sayısında artışa 
neden olacağı hipotezini öne sürmektedir. Bu hipotez, ulusal petrol şirketleri ve yöneim 
kurulları üzerine geniş çaplı bir literatür taraması sonucunda üretilmiştir. Bu hipozi test 
etmek için olabildiğince farklı sistemler tasarımı (OFST) kullanılmıştır. Karşılaştırma, 
OFST’nın uygulanmasına en uygun iki vaka olan Saudi Aramco ve Equinor arasında 
yapılmıştır.  Karşılaştırmanın sonucu, ulusal petrol şirketlerinin küresel petrol piyasasına 
entegrasyon seviyesindeki değişiklik ile yabancı uyruklu kurul üyelerinin sayısındaki 
değişim arasında bir korelasyon olduğunu göstermekte, böylece hipotezi 
doğrulamaktadır. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
One hundred and sixty years from the first modern drilling, oil still remains as the world’s 
primary source of energy supply. Today, almost all aspects of our daily lives are 
dominated by oil. Transportation, the production of plastic goods, generation of 
electricity, operations of factories, and many other inevitable aspects of our lives are built 
on the presence of oil. Oil became the cause of many wars. The existence of oil made 
some nations extremely wealthy, and the ability to control oil gave political power to 
others. In short, from individuals to nations, oil has become an indispensable and vital 
commodity for everyone.  
 
Due to this strategic and practical importance, shortly after its discovery, the control of 
oil became a main concern. In its early years, the control of oil was in the hands of a small 
group. Oil was controlled either by major oil companies or the National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) of some colonial powers until the mid-20th century. Authority over the resources 
transformed in time, and countries with oil reserves started to take control of oil by 
establishing their own NOCs. With this shift, both the economic and political power of 
oil holders were reshaped. In this new environment, oil reserves were operated by two 
types of companies: International Oil Companies (IOCs) and National Oil Companies 
(NOCs).  
 
The struggle for the control of oil has never ended, and oil has become a source of many 
domestic and international conflicts in several countries, such as Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, 
Venezuela, and South Sudan. However, the changing conditions of the global energy 
market, such as the emergence of unconventional oil suppliers, decrease in the supply of 
some of the leading oil producers due to political instabilities, and rising volatility in the 
oil prices raised new concerns for oil producers. The main concern of oil producers 
became increasing or at least keeping their market share rather than increasing the amount 
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of reserve under their control (Finley 2011). As primary actors of oil production, oil 
companies were some of, if not, the most affected players from this geopolitical change. 
Until these recent changes, NOCs had been the dominant actors in the oil market, but the 
discovery of unconventional oil especially created a competitive environment in the 
market and how NOCs reflected this change became critical for the future of their 
existence in the market.  
 
In order to adapt to these new conditions, integrating further into the global market turned 
out to be a must for NOCs. The corporate governance structure of NOCs can be a 
significant indicator of these NOCs, as it is the primary mechanism that shapes their 
strategy. Therefore, in analyzing the level of integration of NOCs into the global market, 
the board structure, the main body of corporate governance, can be an important indicator.  
Taking this into consideration, this study focuses on the relation between the level of 
integration of NOCs into the global market and the number of international members on 
their board. More specifically, I look at the diversification in the operations of Saudi 
Aramco and Equinor as the indicators of these companies’ integration into the global 
market and the international members on the boards of these companies. I controlled 
several variables in order to make sure that these variables do not affect the causal link 
between the independent and dependent variable. These variables are the regime of Saudi 
Arabia and Norway, respectively home countries of Saudi Aramco and Equinor, 
geographic features and geopolitical risks in Saudi Arabia and Norway, the initial culture 
of Saudi Aramco and Equinor, and the amount of reserves under the control of these 
companies. My expectation is to find a correlation between the diversification in the 
operations and the internationalization of the boards. My findings are in line with my 
expectation.   
 
 
1.1. Outline of the Chapters 
 
 
The chapters of the thesis are organized as follows: Following the introduction, the second 
chapter is a historical overview, which is divided into five sections. In this chapter, I 
firstly briefly overview the first oil discoveries in the world. Secondly, I summarize the 
phase of the emergence of first NOCs and their evolution. After clarifying the distinctions 
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between IOCs and NOCs, I describe different types of IOCs and NOCs. Lastly, I touch 
upon the current setups in the global oil market and the role of NOCs in this international 
setting. In chapter three, an extensive literature review is presented in four parts. The 
literature review firstly reviews the literature on state-owned enterprises and their role in 
the global market. The second focus is on the literature on the state involvement in the 
petroleum industry and the creation of NOCs. As part of the discussion on NOCs, I focus 
on the literature on the role played by the board of directors in corporate governance. 
Lastly, I review the literature on the conflict resolution role played by boards of directors 
in enterprises. The fourth chapter is about the methodology of the thesis. Chapter five is 
the empirical part of the thesis. In this chapter, I compare Saudi Aramco, and Equinor 
regarding the specified independent, dependent, and control variables and finally, analyze 
the findings.  
 
 
1.2.Terminology 
 
 
Some of the terminology used in this thesis may need a brief explanation to clarify what 
these terms refer to. The definitions of the frequently used terms in this thesis are provided 
below.  
 
National Oil Company (NOC): National Oil Company refers to an oil and gas company, 
which is entirely or in the majority-owned by a government of either an oil-producing or 
oil-consuming state. In this thesis, NOC is used mostly for the companies of oil-producing 
states. NOCs predominantly deal with oil exploration and production, but they can also 
maintain operations in refining, oilfield services, transportation, and marketing. Although 
NOCs are created as domestic companies, they increasingly operate outside of the border 
of their home country. 
 
International Oil Company (IOC): International Oil Company refers to an oil and gas 
company which is owned by private shareholders. States can be a minority shareholder 
in the IOCs. IOCs mostly refer to major oil companies, which operate in not only 
exploration and production but also refining, oilfield services, transportation, and 
marketing. These companies include Total, Exxon Mobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Eni, 
 4 
Chevron, and ConocoPhillips. However, in this thesis, IOC refers to a broader term and 
includes all privately held companies.  
 
Board of Directors (BoDs): Board of Directors refers to a group of people who oversee 
the activities of an organization, which can be either a profit-seeking business, non-profit 
organization, or a government agency. Government regulations and the organization’s 
constitution and bylaws determine the duties, responsibilities, and power of boards. 
Besides, these laws decide the number of board members, the frequency of board 
meetings, and whether members will be appointed or elected.  
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2. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF OIL COMPANIES: FROM 
INTERNATIONAL TO NATIONAL 
 
 
 
3.1. The discoveries of the first oil resources 
 
 
Until the mid-19th century, the use of oil was limited to very few applications, and 
obtained from the already existing oil sources naturally sipped to the surface (Yergin 
1991). Since the existing amount was quite limited, the industry that was based on its 
usage was also not very developed. However, as people’s need for cheaper and flexible 
energy resources, especially for the illumination, increased, their search for alternative 
sources started (Maugeri 2006). As a result, the first oil well in the modern sense was 
successfully drilled in 1859 in Titusville, Pennsylvania, in the Oil Creek Valley, and 
followed by many other discoveries in the U.S. and around the world (Tordo, Tracy, and 
Arfaa 2011). Following the discovery in Titusville, the interest in the region rose 
considerably and only fifteen months after the first discovery, nearly seventy-five wells 
were producing in the region. The amount of daily production was almost fifty barrels in 
the whole of Titusville (Yergin 1991). The invention of the first flowing well1 in 1861 
enabled the production of three thousand barrels a day in the same region. The production 
was rising so quickly that the total amount of production, which was 450,000 barrels in 
1860 reached three million barrels in 1862 (Yergin 1991).   
 
With the development of the petroleum industry in America, the will to reach this new 
source for light (and eventually other applications) emerged in the rest of the world. In 
1961, the first cargo with barrels of oil was transferred from Pennsylvania to London, 
which was the first step in the global oil trade (Yergin 1991). Oil transportation in 
                                                 
1 A well in which the formation pressure is sufficient to produce oil at a commercial rate without requiring a pump is 
called flowing well. 
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America was carried out by horse carters and barges, but the monopolization of these 
carters led to the search for alternatives and thus, the emergence of pipelines in the mid-
1860s (Maugeri 2006).  
 
During this early era of oil production, competition forced producers to produce at the 
fastest and highest capacity possible. This race in production damaged reservoirs and 
created chaos in the region due to high fluctuations in demand, supply and price of oil. In 
1870, the largest oil refinery in the world at the time, Standard Oil Company, was 
established by John D. Rockefeller in Cleveland, Ohio (Maugeri 2006). As a refinery 
company, Standard Oil operated mainly in refining and transportation rather than 
production, mostly profiting from manipulating/shaping relations between producers and 
consumers. Standard Oil dominated the market for several decades by controlling both 
pipelines, shipping, and drilling business. In the 1880s, the company was in control of 90 
percent of U.S. refineries, pipelines, and other transportation tools. Its monopolist (and 
monopsonist) position often created a row among lawmakers, who argued that the 
company should be broken down. 
 
Standard Oil was monopolist and monopsonist over the oil market with 85 percent of the 
world’s oil production until the mid-1880s. The oil production in Russia was initiated by 
Ludwig and Robert Nobel (Cowles 1973). With the leadership of the Nobel family, then 
with the entrance of the Rothschild family, Russia became the second oil producer in the 
world. Meanwhile in Europe, private companies were enjoying the advantage their home 
countries provided in producing oil in the colonies. As the two major companies in 
Europe, both Shell and Royal Dutch started a business in Indonesia in the 1890s. These 
developments around the world weakened Standard Oil in the oil market. The weakening 
of Standard Oil was also fastened by the developments in the U.S. The discovery of 
reserves in Texas in 1901 decreased the significance of western Pennsylvania, where 
Standard Oil was sustaining its operations. These discoveries led to the establishment of 
oil companies, namely Texas Oil Company (1902) and Gulf Oil Company (1907) (Parra 
2004). Simultaneously, a campaign against Rockefeller and his dominance over the oil 
industry occurred in the U.S. As a result of investigations and trials, in 1911, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided for the partition of the company into more than thirty companies. 
This break-up formed the main contours of the IOC scene in the globe, the contours of 
which can still be traced today. 
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By the 20th century, oil was no longer used solely for illumination. More than 200 
derivatives of oil were used in various areas of daily life by then. The developments in 
the automotive industry especially created a large market for the use of oil products. 
Developments in military technology further increased oil demand. In 1911, Winston 
Churchill, as the first lord of Admiralty, attempted to change the British fleet from coal 
to oil, and the change was approved in 1913 (Victor 2013). With this change, the U.K. 
aimed to upgrade its fleet in terms of speed and range but lost its energy self-sufficiency 
that was otherwise derived from being dependent on British coal. At the time, Great 
Britain was supplying almost half of the coal in the world but did not have oil either in 
the country or in its colonies. As a solution for this problem, the government purchased 
the majority shares of the Anglo-Persian oil company in 1914 (today’s BP), which was 
established in 1909, following the first oil discoveries in the Abadan region of Iran.  
 
The emergence of WWI in 1914 strengthened the idea that the control of oil was crucial 
as petroleum was the primary fuel for all the transportation equipment used in the war. 
Indeed, global oil consumption rose by 50 percent between 1914 and 1918. However, 
during the war, while the U.S. was still the major oil producer in the world, the U.S. 
Senate expressed that most of the American oil fields were about to run out. The 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia further decreased oil supply and the production in Azeri 
fields dropped to minimal levels. This global decrease in oil production motivated Great 
Britain to explore oil in the Middle East.  
 
In 1912, the Turkish Petroleum Company was founded by BP, Shell, and Deutsche Bank 
to obtain concessions in Mesopotamia. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, TPC 
gained a concession to oil explorations and the first oil was found in Kirkuk in 1927. In 
1928, Total and the predecessors of Exxon mobile became equal shareholders of TPC. 
The discoveries in the Middle East continued as following; Bahrain in 1932, Qatar in 
1935, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait in 1938, the United Arab Emirates in 1958 and Oman in 
1964.  
 
The case of Iraq was the first attempt by Western oil companies, which later dominated 
the market and gained control of oil in the Middle East. These companies (Exxon, 
Chevron, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, BP, and Shell) were later called “seven sisters” by 
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Enrique, head of Italy’s national oil company (Sampson 1975). Some of these major 
international companies took part in oil discoveries in Latin America, mainly Mexico and 
Venezuela in the first three decades of the 20th century.  
 
 
3.2. A Brief History of NOCs 
 
 
The history of NOCs dates back to the early twentieth century (Noreng 1994). 
Government interest in oil started to increase as the use of oil expanded, and oil became 
a strategically valuable commodity. Accordingly, the first NOC was created in 1914, 
during WWI, by Great Britain, a consumer country at the time. The Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company had control of oil in Iran until the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951. Winston 
Churchill addresses the motivation behind the creation of this NOC by using the 
following words, “If we cannot get oil, we cannot get corn, we cannot get cotton, and we 
cannot get a thousand and one commodities necessary for the preservation of the 
economic energies of Great Britain” (cited in Yergin 1991). 
 
NOC creation continued with other European countries, especially the colonial powers. 
As the strategic importance of oil increased, colonial powers began to show an interest in 
the resources in their colonies. France and Italy became the first states to establish NOCs 
in Europe. France established its NOC, Compagne Française des Petroles (CFP), in 1924. 
Two years later, Italia established its NOC, Azienda Generale Italiano Petroli (AGIP) 
(Victor, Hults and Thurber 2012). Almost at the same time with European countries, Latin 
American countries, which mostly gained their independence from Spanish colonialism 
during the early 19th century, established their NOCs, as important oil discoveries took 
place in the region. The first of these NOCs established in Argentina in 1922 is called 
Yasimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) (van der Linde 2000; McPherson 2003). Since 
the company operated in both the exploration, production, transportation, refinery and 
marketing of oil and gas in the country, YPF became the first vertically integrated NOC. 
The motive behind the creation of the company was to achieve economic independence 
in Argentina. Following Argentina, Chile (1926), Uruguay (1931), Peru (1934), Bolivia 
(1936) and Mexico (1938) became other NOC establishing countries in Latin America. 
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The Mexican NOC, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) is noteworthy among these cases 
since PEMEX was the first extensive nationalization attempt in the world oil history.   
 
During the 1930s, oil discoveries in the Middle East caused a geographic shift in global 
oil production. A private-consortia formed by international oil companies, controlled 
petroleum production in the Middle East. For instance, U.S. companies set up the Aramco 
Oil Company to run oil production in Saudi Arabia. Following WWII, rapid economic 
growth in the United States increased the demand for oil. However, the country was 
already the most explored and drilled region in the world. In the meantime, due to its 
higher productivity and less marginal cost compared to the United States, Middle Eastern 
oil became the primary source of international oil trade and the United States became a 
net oil importer, which would prevent the country from manipulating the market (Yergin 
1991; van der Linde 2000; Maugeri 2006). It reached a point where from the 1940s to the 
1970s, seven out of ten new barrels of oil were coming from the Middle East (Mommer 
2002).  
 
The changing conditions in petroleum production, especially in the Middle East, 
increased the bargaining power of host countries against international oil companies 
(IOCs), which opened the way to a new era (Marcel 2006). In the late 1940s and early 
1950s, oil-producing countries and IOCs grappled continually over the financial terms 
upon which the postwar petroleum order would rest. The main issue between the parties 
was the distribution of rents. The terms of the struggles were different for each country. 
However, the objective for all of these countries was to shift revenues from oil companies 
and the oil-consuming countries that taxed these companies, to oil exporting countries. 
As much as money, the oil exporting countries were also struggling for the power that the 
control of oil brings. At that time, the concession contract included a royalty payment to 
the host country and an income tax. As a result of rising demand of oil-producing 
countries to gain more profit from the oil industry, Venezuela changed the terms of its 
contract with IOCs and brought the “fifty-fifty” profit sharing system in 1948. Saudi 
Arabia followed Venezuela and applied the same system in the country in 1950. 
 
During the 1950s, several oil-producing countries established NOCs to gain control of 
their own oil reserves by nationalizing their natural resources (Victor 2013). The National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in 1951, Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) of Brazil in 1953, 
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and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (OGNC) of India in 1956 were some examples of 
these nationalizations (Bentham and Smith 1987). Although the nationalization of oil 
resources started during the 1950s, the major nationalizations took place during the 
1970s. During these nationalizations, the only major economy that did not attempt to 
create a NOC or centralize its oil industry under state control was the United States. 
However, even some of the states in the U.S. tried to imply some strict regulatory rules 
(Victor 2013). 
 
As part of the increasing state control over the petroleum industry, the major oil producers 
met in Cairo in 1959. The main purpose of major oil exporting countries was to protect 
their common interest. Following this meeting, in 1960, some of the major oil-producing 
countries, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela founded the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Marcel 2006). The number of OPEC 
members increased in time. Qatar (1961, left in 2019), Indonesia (1962, left in 2008), 
Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates (1967), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), Gabon 
(1975), Angola (2007), Equatorial Guinea (2017) and Congo (2018) became other 
members of the union.  
 
The cartelization did not create the expected result for host countries in the first place. 
These states maintained separate negotiations with private companies and the terms that 
each of these states were willing to agree showed variations. However, the increasing 
demand for oil and diminishing reserves of the U.S. strengthened the hand of host 
countries in the negotiations. In 1968, OPEC published a “Declaratory Statement of 
Petroleum Policy in Member Countries”. OPEC asserts that the declaration emphasized 
“the inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources in the interest of their national development” (OPEC 2019). As a result of these 
steps, and several concession negotiations, OPEC countries gained the right to obtain 75 
percent of the profits of IOCs and the right to be a part of decision-making processes 
about entrepreneurial issues (Maugeri 2006). 
 
As the tendency towards resource nationalization and the number of NOCs increased, the 
structure of the international oil market dramatically changed. At the beginning of the 
1970s, the access of IOCs to the oil market was 85 percent and NOCs’ were barely 1 
percent. By 1980, the access of IOCs dropped to 12 percent and NOCs’ rose to 59 percent 
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(Diwan 2007). The increasing control of states and NOCs over the oil market made oil 
prices more sensitive to political issues, which led to two considerable price crises in the 
1970s (Victor, Hults, and Thurber 2012). After the fourth Arab-Israeli (Yom-Kippur) 
War in 1973, some of the Arab States implied supply restriction under the OPEC 
coordination, which led to supply shortages in Western countries, and as a result came 
the first oil price shock. While the price of oil was around $20 in June 1973, it reached 
almost $50 in six months. The second price shock occurred after the Iranian revolution in 
1979 and the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 because of the drop in Iranian oil production. While 
the price of oil was around $55 in early 1979, it reached $120 in a year. During the supply 
shortages in the 1970s, the only type of states that created NOCs were the oil importing 
ones, in order to protect their oil supply. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the last wave 
of nationalization had only been maintained by former Soviet states. 
 
As a result of the oil nationalizations, by the 1980s, most of the oil resources were under 
state control. However, during the 1980s, the course of events started to change as oil 
prices started to decline. It became visible that some states failed to manage their oil 
effectively. The first steps towards privatization and liberalization at that time was taken 
by mostly oil importing industrialized states. For instance, the U.K. reduced its share in 
BP from 68 to 51 percent in 1977, and also privatized the British National Oil Company 
(BNOC) in 1982, which was established in 1975 as part of the nationalizations. Several 
NOCs of oil importing countries, such as Total, Eni, Elf Aquitaine, OMV and Repsol 
survived as state-owned entities until the end of the 1980s and early 1990s (Victor, Hults, 
and Thurber 2012). 
 
NOCs of oil exporting countries resisted to privatization longer mostly due to the fact that 
oil production in the Middle East had recently been nationalized. In Latin America and 
Africa, on the other hand, natural resource extraction has always been in the purview of 
the state since the end of colonial rule in the region (Waelde 1995). However, due to the 
low prices in the second half of the 1980s, these countries had to make some institutional 
reforms (Stevens 2008). Before the fall of prices in 1982, OPEC imposed supply quotas 
to keep oil prices under control, which worked until 1985. However, within the same 
year, Saudi Arabia brought the netback price system, which is “to value crude oil by 
"netting" costs from the value of products obtained through the refining process” (Mabro 
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1987, p.6), which caused oil prices to sharply decline in 1986 and gave an advantageous 
hand in the market to the importer states.  
 
The first major attempt for the privatization of NOCs in oil exporting countries took place 
in Argentina in 1993 where the government announced that the 32 state-owned 
companies were eligible to privatization. Yasimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), one of 
the first established NOCs, was also among these companies, and later in the 1990s, it 
was privatized in two steps (Grosse and Yanes 1998). Following Argentina, the 
privatizations continued in Latin America. As part of the privatizations, PEMEX and 
PDVSA demanded more private sector involvement (Howell 2007). The spread of 
privatization also affected other parts of the world. For instance, China and India 
encouraged the private sector to take control of minor portions of their NOCs. Russia also 
privatized its oil sector, although the new owners had strong ties with the government 
(Aslund 1999).  
 
During the 1990s, oil production in non-OPEC countries increased. Many countries did 
not comply with output restrictions of OPEC. From 1986 onwards, Saudi Arabia followed 
the policy of low and stable oil prices in order to encourage the use of oil (Tordo, Tracy, 
and Arfaa 2011). Combined with all of these, OPEC increased its members’ production 
quota in 1997, which resulted with a high amount of surplus and again the decrease of 
prices. While the oil price was around $75 at the beginning of the 1990s, it fell around 
$20 in 1998. The increase in non-OPEC production caused a decrease in the market share 
of NOCs, since oil in non-OPEC countries was mostly operated by IOCs. The decrease 
in the market share of NOCs weakened the power states with NOCs had to control the oil 
market by affecting oil prices. Therefore, these new conditions created a need to adopt to 
the transformation in the international market. 
 
The new millennium started with the recovery of oil prices, which affected the policies 
towards NOCs in different ways. On the one hand, the wave of privatization continued. 
China, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Norway, and Japan partially privatized their NOCs. On the 
other hand, high oil prices put oil exporting countries into an advantageous position and 
increased their bargaining power. The perception that there was a scarce oil resource 
increased governments’ desire to increase their share in the oil. 
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3.3. The difference between NOCs and IOCs 
 
 
The major difference between NOCs and IOCs is the owner of a company. In NOCs, 
either a government is the only owner such as PDVSA, Saudi Aramco, NIOC and most 
other NOCs, or a government is a majority shareholder. Equinor, Petrobras and Oil and 
Gas Corporation (ONGC) of India are examples of the second type of NOCs. Companies 
with the government as a minority shareholder are more like IOCs rather than NOCs. 
Italian Eni is the most well-known example of this type of NOC. The rest of the oil 
companies, 100 percent owned by private shareholders, are called IOCs. However, it is 
not always easy to clearly distinguish these two categories from each other. Many 
companies, which started to operate as NOCs have been privatized and sustain their 
operations as IOCs such as Total (privatized in 1985), BP (in 1979) and ENI S.p.A (in 
1992) (Any Myers Jaffe and Wilson 2007). On the other hand, some others, like Saudi 
Aramco, were established as IOCs and nationalized later.  
 
The rest of the comparison is more about the factors that determine the market positions 
of NOCs and IOCs. Hartley and Medlock (2008) show that NOCs tend to underperform 
compared to IOCs. They mostly adopt different production policies. Overall, NOCs tend 
to produce less than IOCs annually (Eller, Hartley, and Medlock III 2007; Victor 2007). 
The objectives of NOCs and IOCs also differ from each other. While IOCs adopt only 
commercial objectives, NOCs undertake several missions other than profit-maximizing. 
Another difference is the variation in the taxation policies over NOCs and IOCs. Although 
these details are not always public, many NOCs operate under different taxation policy 
than international companies. Lastly, NOCs and IOCs do not have equal access to oil 
reserves. NOCs generally have higher access to the reserves (Pirog 2007). 
 
 
3.4. Types of IOCs and NOCs 
 
 
Besides their differences, IOCs and NOCs also differentiate within themselves. IOCs can 
be categorized according to their operational capacity as majors and independents. The 
majors refer to the world’s largest six private oil companies, namely Total, Exxon Mobil, 
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BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Eni, and Chevron. Sometimes, ConocoPhillips is also listed 
among the majors. The history of Exxon Mobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and Chevron 
dates back to “Seven Sisters”, when seven oil companies dominated the oil market 
between the 1940s and 1970s. The majors are also known as big oil or supermajors. 
Today, these companies control only 6 percent of the world’s total reserves. Therefore, 
compared to NOCs, the market share of majors in oil production is quite low. The 
common feature of majors is that these companies are all vertically integrated. Vertical 
integration means that these companies operate in both upstream, midstream, and 
downstream operations, three steps of the supply chain in the global oil market (Heungjo 
et al. 2011) Upstream refers to the exploration, drilling, and production of oil. Midstream 
includes anything about transportation, storage, and marketing of crude or refined oil. As 
the last step, downstream involves anything about the refining of crude oil, and 
distribution and marketing of products of crude oil. 
 
Independent oil companies, on the other hand, are defined as non-integrated oil 
companies. These companies operate mostly in upstream. Cairn Energy in the U.K., 
California Resource Corporation in the U.S. and Enerplus in Canada are some of the 
examples of independent oil companies. As opposed to Majors, Independents are 
generally not involved in downstream and midstream operations.  
 
NOCs can be categorized according to the types of states in control of the company. 
NOCs can be created either by oil-consuming countries or by oil-producing countries. 
Consumer’s national oil companies (CNOCs) are established to meet the oil demands of 
oil-consuming countries. Anglo Persian Oil Company created by Great Britain was the 
first example of CNOCs. This type of NOC was more prevalent before the 1970s, the 
time of resource nationalizations. The oil demand of emerging economies, such as China 
and India, increased since the beginning of the millennium. To meet this demand, during 
the 2000s, especially China and India, increased their operations with their CNOCs. The 
major CNOCs of China through which the company aimed to meet the oil demand in the 
country, are China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). 
The leading Indian CNOCs are Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Indian Oil 
Corporation, Hindustan Petroleum.  
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Producers’ national oil companies (PNOCs), on the other hand, are companies established 
by resource owner states in order to control the oil reserves of the home country. The first 
PNOC was established in 1922 by Argentina and was followed by several other PNOCs, 
especially after the nationalizations during the 1970s. Today PNOCs constitute the 
majority of NOCs in the world. Both Saudi Aramco and Equinor fall into the group of 
PNOCs.  
 
 
3.5. Current Setups and the role of NOCs in the Global Oil Market 
 
 
The start of the new millennium witnessed a significant demand for oil from the large 
emerging economies, such as China and India, which shaped the forecasts about the 
demand for oil (IEA 2015). From 2000 to 2010, while the world total oil demand had 
increased by15 percent, the rise in the demand of China was 81 percent, and the rise in 
the demand of India was 57 percent. The average annual increase in the demand of China 
was almost 8 percent, and in the demand of India was 5.7 percent. The share of China and 
India’s demand increase in the world total demand increase was 44 percent. 
 
In addition to the rising demand, the conflicts in the Middle East such as the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the Israel Lebanon War in 2006, caused a devaluation of 
the U.S. dollar, and reports indicating that the amount petroleum reserves are in decline 
caused an increase in the oil prices until 2008. While the oil price was around $35 in early 
2003, it reached $160 in June 2008. However, the effect did not last so long, and in six 
months from the peak, the price dropped again, and in January 2009, it was $36. 
 
From 2009 to 2011, oil prices recovered, and at the beginning of 2011, the price was 
around $90. During 2011, Arab Spring protests erupted in the Middle East and North 
Africa, which led to a revolution in Egypt and a civil war in Libya, the two major oil 
producers in the region. The conflicts in the region caused a decrease in the level of oil 
production, especially by Libya. While crude oil production in Libya was 1.7 mmboe in 
2010, it fell to 0.5 mmboe in 2011. At that time, sanctions against Iran were also a factor 
in the decrease in oil supply. As a result of the fall of the oil supply, the oil price reached 
around $115 in 2011.  
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Many other developments after 2010 affected the price of oil considerably. The high 
growth of the emerging economy at the beginning of millennium started to slow down 
after 2010. Accordingly, the level of oil consumption did not rise as expected. Besides, 
one of the groundbreaking developments in the oil industry took place in the United States 
in 2011. Shale Revolution, the combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling 
from tight oil, changed the balance in the oil market (EIA 2011). Thanks to the shale 
industry, the U.S. became a major exporter in less than a decade, which changed the 
balance in the global market and deeply affected the market position of the NOCs (IEA 
2018).  In 2011, the total oil supply in the world was 86.6 mb/d (million barrel per day), 
in which the share of OPEC (most of the NOC owners) was 35.7 mb/d, and the share of 
non-OPEC countries was 48.8 mb/d (IEA 2011). Within the non-OPEC countries, the 
share of the U.S. was 8.1 mb/p (IEA 2011). In 2014, the total oil supply rose to 89.3 mb/d, 
in which the share of OPEC was 36.7 mb/d, and the share of non- OPEC countries was 
52.8 mb/d. Within the non-OPEC countries, the share of the U.S. was 11.8 mb/d. In other 
words, overall non-OPEC production increased from 56 percent to almost 59 percent. 
The share of U.S. production increased from 9 percent to around 13 percent from 2011 to 
2014. Almost all of the increase in the share of non-OPEC production in the total world 
supply comes from the U.S. shale. 
 
In return for rising oil supply, OPEC, especially Saudi Aramco, one of the major oil 
suppliers of the world, decided not to decrease their production level. In other words, the 
company preferred low oil prices over a decrease in its market share. Since Saudi Arabia 
has the lowest cost of production, the country could handle low oil prices longer than the 
new shale producers such as the U.S., and Canada, where the cost of production is much 
higher. As a result of these developments in the market, the oil price started to decrease 
from $110 in the midst of 2014. At the beginning of 2015, the price fell to $55.   
 
OPEC did not sustain its lax supply policy, and in November 2016, they had an agreement 
with non-OPEC countries to cut their total oil supply 1.2 mb/d from January 1, 2017 
(OPEC 2016). The sanctions on Iran, the crisis in Venezuela and the war in Libya also 
created a supply shortage in the market. Consequently, from mid-2017 to mid-2018, the 
price of oil increased from around $50 to $75. In the meantime, U.S. President Donald 
Trump made several calls to OPEC for price restraint. Then, in June 2018, in the OPEC 
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ministers’ meeting, OPEC decided to increase its production by one mb/d, and the oil 
prices started to decline again. 
 
The recent developments created various challenges for NOCs. Price volatility increased 
considerably. In the times of high oil prices, many NOCs predominantly focused on crude 
oil production rather than investments in technological developments since production 
was the easiest and quickest way to make money. However, the low-price environment 
created a challenge not only for these NOCs but also for their home countries. The 
decrease in the fall of prices led to a fall in the revenues of the budgets of these countries. 
Therefore, this new environment created pressure on the NOCs to sustain their revenues.  
 
On the other hand, the low-price environment did not create the expected result over shale 
producers because when the oil prices are low, shale producers can continue drilling but 
can store the oil in the ground. In other words, the flexibility in production contributed to 
shale producers’ sustainability in the market. Therefore, the main concern is not the 
amount of controlled reserve anymore. What gains importance is the amount of market 
share that any company holds.  
 
All these challenges created the need to become more integrated into the global market 
to minimize the effect of the challenges on their operations. In other words, NOCs have 
drawn to decrease their dependency to create value on crude oil production, and their 
operations in their home country while increasing their joint operations with other 
international companies.  
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3. NOCs IN THE GLOBAL MARKET: THE DETERMINANTS OF THEIR 
MARKET INTEGRATION  
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
Starting from the 1930s, Keynesianism, which prescribes state intervention to counter 
business/macrocycles, became modus operandi for states and their management of public 
finances, especially until the end of the 1970s (Kwiatkowski and Augustynowicz 2015). 
Keynesianism promotes state intervention in the market by increasing government 
expenditure and lowering taxes (Hall 1989). Until the early 1980s, states had a significant 
role in the economies of both developed and developing countries by controlling critical 
mechanisms through ownership (Toninelli 2000). However, during the early 1980s, the 
spread of neoliberal economics and policies (and the Washington Consensus) started to 
reverse this trend (Carroll and Sapinski 2016). Inefficient performance of state-controlled 
economies at that time and the collapse of socialist states, whose economies were 
primarily based on state control, were among the key arguments of neoliberals (Plehwe 
2016). Nevertheless, states have continued to exert significant control over the economy 
through state-owned enterprises (OECD 2017). 
 
According to Dieter Bös’ (1989) categorization, SOEs fall into four groups; public 
services (utilities, communications, and transportation), basic commodities (coal, oil, 
atomic energy, steel), finance (bank, insurance) and education/health. Among these 
sectors, the oil and gas industry always had a significant role both for countries’ domestic 
market and the global market as its share in the energy supply. According to International 
Energy Agency (2018), by the end of 2016, in the world total primary energy, the share 
of oil was 31.9 percent, and the share of gas was 22.1 percent. In other words, oil and gas 
constitute more than 50 percent of the world’s energy supply. None of the oil producers 
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in the world, except for the U.S. and mostly the U.K, leaves the oil industry entirely to 
the private sector. Even in the U.S. and U.K several debates take place to increase state 
regulations over the oil industry, so much so that free-market becomes questionable. 
However, the idea of nationalization came with the post-colonial era; Saudi Aramco 
operated as a privately-owned oil company from the 1940s to 1980s.  
 
The primary tool of states to control oil and gas production either in their home country 
or in other oil-producing countries is NOCs. Today, NOCs control 80 percent of the 
proven world oil reserves and produce 58 percent of world supply (ENI 2018). NOCs 
have similar dominance in the natural gas industry, but measuring gas supply and 
dominance is harder because the infrastructure for supply is at least as important as the 
raw production of fuel (Victor, Jaffe, and Hayes 2006). Besides, an estimated 60 percent 
of undiscovered oil and gas reserves fall into the areas where NOCs have privileged 
access to reserves (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). These numbers indicate that despite 
all the discussions on the importance of NOCs, they are still one of the most important 
actors in the oil and gas industry, and they will remain so for a while. Furthermore, if 
needed, NOCs can produce at a loss to give political leverage to their countries.  
Therefore, their role in the global market is a critical issue for the future of the energy 
market. Understanding how NOCs function, in turn, is essential in understanding how 
these companies will shape energy markets. This thesis will focus on one specific aspect 
of NOC structure - the composition of its board.  
 
In this chapter, first, SOEs and their role in the global market and the literature on 
NOCs will be examined. Then, the literature on the role of the board of directors in the 
companies will be reviewed. A further discussion of what role NOCs boards can play in 
shaping energy markets will then follow. The conflict resolution role of the board of 
directors in the literature will be examined.  
 
 
3.2. State-Owned Enterprises in the Global Market 
 
 
State-owned enterprises have been a major class of players in shaping the national and 
global economy. According to the World Bank (2014), SOEs constitute more than 10 
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percent of the world’s largest firms. OECD (2005) defines SOEs as “enterprises where 
states have significant control, through full, majority, or significant minority ownership.” 
IFC defines SOE as “a legal entity that is majority-owned or controlled by a national or 
local government whether directly or indirectly.” As both definitions contend, the share 
of the state in the business is not a determinant by itself for an entity to be considered as 
state-owned. What really matters for ownership distinction is how much control states 
have over these enterprises. Privately-owned enterprises, on the other hand, are defined 
as industry and businesses owned by ordinary people, not by the government. 
 
An extensive amount of work indicates that ownership is one of the key determinants of 
the performance of firms (see, inter alia, Zou and Adams 2008; Boubakri et al. 2016; 
Fitza and Tihanyi 2017). Many of these works find that SOEs perform lower than POEs 
in profitability (Pollitt 1995; Bozec, Breton, and Louise 2002) by grounding their claim 
on mainly three theories, which are the property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz 
1973), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and public choice theory (Niskanen 
1971; Tullock 1976). According to the property rights theorists, in the SOEs, there is no 
dominant authority to claim right over profits, which would let the firm pursue goals other 
than profit maximization (Martin and Parker 1997; Pratuckchai and Patanapongse 2012). 
Due to the fact that the existence of a robust monitoring mechanism checking the 
performance of the firm in the SOEs is rare, according to the public choice theorists, 
politicians and bureaucrats can more easily pursue their own interests over firms. For 
instance, they care about the amount of resource under their control and their prestige 
more than the firm’s efficiency and productivity (Niskanen 1971; De Alessi 1983). 
  
Although all these theories indicate that POEs outperform SOEs, they do not show any 
data about the current market position of the SOEs, which is necessary to understand the 
role of SOEs in the global market. However, it is essential to note that in this thesis, only 
the firms that are at least 50.01 percent state-owned are considered as the SOE, which 
means many firms under state control are not counted as SOEs. Besides that, according 
to the same data, SOEs’ contribution to the global investment in 2006 was 20 percent 
(World Bank 2014), which clearly shows that it is not possible to ignore the effect of the 
SOEs on the global market.  
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3.3. Discussions on State Involvement in the Petroleum Industry 
 
 
Since the mid-19th century,  after the first Royal Commission Report on the coal industry 
in Britain, energy has been considered as the “commanding height” of the economies and 
it is accepted as one of the political issues (Grayson 1981). Most of the oil-producing 
states had early experience with IOCs. These IOCs were mostly backed by imperialist 
powers of the time. Based on their experience with IOCs, oil-producing states perceived 
the control of IOCs over the oil resources as losing sovereignty over their own country, 
especially during the 1950s (Madelin 1974; Grayson 1981). Therefore, the idea of gaining 
sovereignty over the natural resources created a political basis for several early NOCs 
(Olorunfemi 1991; Stevens 2003). For instance, the nationalization of oil in Mexico is 
celebrated as a federal holiday in the country.  
 
The rest of the arguments in favor of NOCs are generally based on economic motives. 
The first argument is that the operation of IOCs creates information asymmetry between 
the company and the government. Until 1973, international oil companies isolated 
themselves from the domestic economy of the countries that they operate in, which 
prevented governments from having access to the information they needed (van der Linde 
2000). The inability of the oil-producing state to run the industry by itself gives the 
company an advantage in its bargaining with the government (Nore 1980). To prevent 
this asymmetry, governments established NOCs, which enables them to have first-hand 
information about the operations and financial conditions (Grayson 1981).  
 
Another motive for establishing NOCs is increasing the amount of rent captured by a 
state, which is determined by two conditions; the total amount of rent created in the 
petroleum industry and the relative share captured by the state and its agent (NOC) 
(Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). When the petroleum industry of the state is under control 
of the international oil market, it is hard to implement conventional fiscal instruments, 
such as royalties, income taxes, and production sharing contracts, which are not easily 
adaptable to the dynamic market conditions (Kemp 1992). However, when states have 
control of the industry, they are able to capture all of the rent, which made the idea of 
establishing NOCs highly attractive for states.  
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The last argument in favor of NOCs is the difference between state and private interests 
with respect to time horizons. The idea is that since it is for their national interests, states 
concern more about the future of the oil sector in the country (Noreng 1997). These 
national interests are mainly the security of supply within the country, conservation of oil 
reserves, increase in commercial and technical capabilities, and the creation of a fund to 
infrastructural investments and generation of “proper returns” (Nore 1980; Grayson 1981; 
Benthan 1988; Horn 1995; McPherson 2003). 
 
Despite these arguments in favor of NOCs, their performance is generally lower than 
expected, which gives rise to the substantial arguments against their existence. The first 
argument claims that NOCs can have too much power in domestic politics. Generally, it 
is assumed that NOCs protect the interests of governments as opposed to private 
companies. However, generally, the case is that NOCs use governments for their interests 
(Waelde 1995). Thus, the power of the NOC creates the possibility that the NOC acts as 
a state within the state (Waelde 1995), which is in conflict with the elimination of 
information asymmetry argument. This is because it causes information asymmetry, but 
this time between the government and itself (van der Linde 2000; Paul Stevens 2003), 
cementing unprofitable actions that would be hurtful to remove for vested interests in that 
NOC. 
 
The economic perspective posits arguments about objectives of NOCs, the efficiency of 
NOCs, the competitiveness of NOCs, and the corporate governance structure of NOCs. 
The first argument is about to what extent the objectives of the NOCs align with creating 
value for these companies. State control imposes various missions on NOCs, which are 
generally in conflict with the commercial interests of the company. States tend to use 
NOCs as a tool for their campaign in domestic politics and also as leverage in their foreign 
policy. Although some scholars describe these objectives as advantageous for the 
government, they only bring political benefits to the government with some economic 
costs (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011), and in the longer term, can harm governance 
quality as well (Bayulgen 2010).  Another mission that states put on the NOCs is social 
investments, which have been of more interest recently. As opposed to political goals, 
these investments do not prevent them from achieving financial goals or do not decrease 
their efficiency when the costs are managed effectively. However, the problem is their 
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success level in achieving these goals. NOCs tend to show a low level of success in these 
investments due to a lack of supervision over the expenses (Robinson 1993). 
 
One of the most common critiques of NOCs concerns their levels of efficiency in their 
operations. NOCs are generally accused of being operationally less efficient than IOCs 
due to their technical and managerial incapability and human resource policies (Jaidah 
1980; Al-Mazeedi 1992; Gochenour 1992). During the 1970s, a wave of nationalizations 
gave control of most of the sources to the NOCs while putting the IOCs temporarily 
outside of the oil market or sent them further down in the oil-value chain (i.e. distribution 
and retail). High oil prices, then, allowed IOCs to invest in high-tech exploration and 
drilling, allowing operational efficiency advantages bear fruit. NOCs, on the other hand, 
fell behind technological developments because they preferred to manage the current 
system instead of investing in research and development to lower the costs and increase 
revenue (Paul Stevens 2003). Besides, the employment strategy of NOCs creates 
obstacles for their efficiency, often prioritizing aspects other than the qualifications of 
candidates (Waelde 1995; Al-Mazeedi 1992). 
 
Another problem with NOCs is the lack of competitive environment, which is an 
important contributor to the performance of a company (Boardman and Vining 1989; 
Galal, Jones, and Vogelsang 1994; Nickell 1996). The competition encourages 
innovation, improves managerial capabilities, and otherwise augments efficiency 
(Beesley and Littlechild 1983).  
 
The last critique of NOCs is related to their governance structure. Several scholars argue 
that NOCs do not have strong corporate governance compared to IOCs (Victor 2007; 
Eller, Hartley, and Medlock III 2007). Since the managers and government officials tend 
to have conflicting interests over the company, NOCs are generally not successful in 
developing effective schemes of corporate governance.  
 
 
3.4. The Role of the Board of Directors as a Part of Corporate Governance 
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The board of directors in NOCs may be critical because their decision-making power can 
transform the position of the company in the market. In other words, robust corporate 
governance can increase the level of supervision over the company’s performance, 
efficiency, and integration into the competitive market environment.  
 
In its broadest definition, corporate governance is “all the influences affecting the 
institutional processes, including those for appointing the controllers and/or regulators, 
involved in organizing the production and sale of goods and services” (Turnbull 1997). 
The concern of corporate governance is to preserve the mechanism which helps owners 
and shareholders to control corporate insiders and management through legal institutional 
and cultural mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; John and Senbet 1999). A wealth of 
studies demonstrate the relationship between specific corporate governance 
characteristics and firm value (Yermack 1996; Core, Guay, and Rusticus 2006; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009).  
 
 The board of directors, as a major component of corporate governance, has a significant 
role in sustaining an effective organization (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; OECD 
1999; Jensen 1993). The different roles the board of directors play can be collapsed to 
three main categories: service, strategy, and control (Zahra and Pearce 1989). As part of 
its service role, boards have the responsibility to represent a firm’s interest in the 
community, increase the connection of the firm with its external environment and pursue 
regular activities to sustain the functionality of the company (Zald 1969; Pfeffer 1972; 
Mintzberg 1983). These service activities of the board of directors constitute ways to 
enhance the company’s identity, reputation, commitment to its mission, and most 
important of all, to ensure its survival (Provan 1980). As part of their strategic role, boards 
have the responsibility to be a part of mission development of the company, selection and 
implementation of the company’s strategy (Judge and Zeithaml 1990). The primary 
purpose of the board of directors, stemming from this strategic role is to increase the 
competitiveness of the company and to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Brickley and 
James 1987). Besides, the strategic role is important in the sense that it sets a specific 
target for the company. The last role of the board of directors is to control the executive 
body of the company. It has the power to monitor, evaluate and reward executives and 
their performance to protect the interests of shareholders, and to decrease agency costs, 
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which can arise because of the duality in the ownership and control (John and Senbet 
1999). 
 
Although almost all of the boards of directors across industries officially carry these roles, 
not all of them perform each of these functions at the same level of effectiveness. Several 
factors determine board effectiveness, such as size, composition, and level of 
independence (John and Senbet 1999). No consensus in the literature exists about the 
effect of the size of the board. According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), 
as the size of the board expands, their capacity for monitoring increases due to increasing 
levels of expertise in the group. Yermack (1996), though, finds an inverse relationship 
between the size of boards and the firm value. Similarly, several studies indicate that as 
the size of boards enlarges, the decision-making process of the board will be harder 
(Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker 1994; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998; Forbes 
and Milliken 1999).  
 
A close relationship seems to exist between the two significant factors of effectiveness;  
the composition of the board seems to affect its level of independence from shareholders 
(John and Senbet 1999). Therefore, these two factors can be discussed together. The 
organizational management literature on board composition primarily focuses on the ratio 
of insider-outsider (independent) members (Pfeffer 1972; John and Senbet 1999; Van 
Den Berghe and Levrau 2004). Insider board members usually belong to two of the 
following groups: members who represent the owner with a major commercial interest in 
the firm or the foreign shareholders of the firm (Baysinger and Butler 1985). Outsider 
members, who are independent of the ownership structure, are elected by shareholders, 
employees, or an assembly which is responsible for the election of board members 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1988). The purpose is mainly to create a check and balance 
system in the governance structure of companies and to show companies’ willingness to 
comply with international corporate governance standards (Baysinger and Butler 1985). 
According to the findings of many studies, provided that the minimum number of insider 
members is preserved, the increase in the number of outsider members enhances a firm’s 
performance (Daily and Dalton 1994; Hermalin and Weisbach 2000; Johnson, Hoskisson, 
and Hitt 1993; Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990).  
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The insider-outsider classification is not always sufficient to understand the effect of 
diversification in board composition. Certain demographic criteria, such as gender, age, 
race, ethnicity, and nationality seem to have an impact on firm performance (Erhardt, 
Werbel, and Shrader 2003; Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles 1997). Several studies indicate 
that demographic diversity in its board increases the performance of a firm (Pearce and 
Zahra 1992; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan 2004; Carter, 
Simkins, and Simpson 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader 2003). Among studies that 
examine board composition, the number of studies that specifically focus on nationally 
of members is relatively small. 
 
Having an international board carries many potential advantages (Randoy, Thomsen, and 
Oxelheim 2006). The presence of international board members gives international 
shareholders confidence that their investment will be adequately monitored (Rosenstein 
and Wyatt 1990). Independent international members, who do not necessarily represent 
shareholders, may also ease the company’s access to foreign investment since the 
presence of such members sends a signal to companies in the global market that the firm 
complies with global standards. Therefore, having a foreign member on the board is a 
step for the globalization process of the company (Oxelheim and Randøy 2003).  
 
 
3.5. The Conflict Resolution Role of Board of Directors  
 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, while the duties of the board of directors are 
addressed in the corporate governance literature, the emphasis is generally on the 
responsibility of the board to protect the interests of the shareholders. However, there is 
a growing conflict resolution literature claiming that the board of directors should also 
address the needs of all the groups who have a stake in the business. The stakeholder 
theory (Freeman 1984) defines a stakeholder as a broad term, which includes employees, 
customers, and local communities as well as shareholders (Harjoto, Laksmana, and Lee 
2015; Cornell and Shapiro 1987). According to this theory, the board of directors has a 
responsibility to resolve the conflict of interests between shareholders and non-investing 
stakeholders, by aligning their interests with each other in order to make the firm perform 
effectively (Freeman 1984; Jo and Harjoto 2012).  
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Engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a common way that board of 
directors use to protect the interests of all stakeholders (Benson and Davidson 2010; 
Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 2003). The term corporate social responsibility is 
defined by Friedman (1970) as "to conduct the business in accordance with shareholders' 
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to 
the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom.” Although the responsibilities of CSR are categorized as “the economic 
responsibility to be profitable, the legal responsibility to obey the laws of society, the 
ethical responsibility to do what is right, just and fair and the philanthropic responsibility 
to provide resources for various kinds of social, educational, recreational or cultural 
purposes” (Harjoto, Laksmana, and Lee 2015). Contemporary studies generally focus on 
CSR’s social aspect rather than legal and economic aspects. Many claims that focus on 
social aspects of CSR come at the expense of the economic value of the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Barnea and Rubin 2010). However, when it comes to the conflict 
resolution role of firms, CSR is accepted as the most effective way of achieving this goal 
according to the stakeholder theory (Fisman, Heal, and Nair 2005)  
 
As mentioned previously, the performance of boards can change according to their 
composition. The level of CSR engagement, an aspect of board performance, can also be 
expected to vary with respect to the composition of boards (Dunn and Sainty 2009; 
Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt 1993; Webb 2004). That said, only a few of these studies 
examining the relationship between board composition focus on board diversity. Studies 
that find a connection between board diversity and CSR engagement posit causality in 
both ways: they either find that board diversity has a positive impact on CSR engagement 
(Bear, Rahman, and Post 2010; Hafsi and Turgut 2013) or firms which have a 
commitment to CSR can tend to have more diversity in their board composition (Webb 
2004; Miller and Del Carmen Triana 2009). The limit of these studies is that almost all 
of them focus on gender diversity. Few scholars have looked at the effect the nationality 
of board members on the CSR engagement, but the present studies find that there is no 
positive relationship between the presence of international members and CSR 
engagement (Barako and Brown 2008; Muttakin, Khan, and Subramaniam 2015; Wallace 
and Naser 1995). 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
 
In today’s world, one of the most critical sectors that states use their power to control the 
economy is the petroleum industry. Therefore, the discussions about NOCs still 
frequently take place among scholars. Despite the claims that states need NOCs to run 
their petroleum industry, there is much empirical evidence demonstrating that the 
performance of NOCs is lower than IOCs, even though NOCs have access to much more 
resources than IOCs.  
 
The relatively low performance of NOCs raised the question of what causes this 
difference between these two types of oil companies. Although there are many different 
answers to this question, it is possible to collect all those answers under a few headings. 
The first disadvantage of NOCs is that they have conflicting objectives. Since states 
mostly use these companies as a political tool, their commercial objectives often remain 
in the background. Another most discussed problem about NOCs is that these companies 
are generally far from the competitive market environment, which triggers other 
problems, such as lack of innovation, efficiency, and corporate governance. Because there 
are many other non-commercial investment areas, arising from political objectives, and 
they already have a monopoly in the market, they do not invest in technological 
developments as much as IOCs. As a result, they create a weaker corporate governance 
system to monitor the performance of the company.  
 
Although these are common problems of NOCs, not every NOC shows these symptoms 
equally. The changing dynamics of oil market forced NOCs to be more integrated into 
the international market to sustain their presence in the market regardless of the exterior 
factors, such as price volatility, political risks, and the diminishing oil resources. 
Therefore, some of the NOCs stepped to adapt their operational structure and governance 
structure accordingly. As the literature indicated, corporate governance is a primary 
monitoring and strategy setting mechanism of a company. The performance of a board 
also depends on some of the features of the boards, such as its size, composition, and 
independence. Although each of these aspects carries special importance in their effects 
on board performance, the composition of a board according to members’ nationality is 
a bit more critical for the integration of NOCs to the international market. Carrying 
 29 
international members can be an easing factor for the integration process. Besides its 
effect on integration, the composition of a board is related to the conflict resolution role 
of the board of directors.  
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
In this thesis, my principal aim is to find how and to what extent the integration of the 
NOCs into the international oil market is related to the presence of international members 
on the board of directors. In order to find an answer to this question, first of all, I found 
how many of the biggest 30 NOCs, for which access to annual reports exist, carry 
international members in their boards. I limited my data from 2012 to 2018, because not 
all NOCs in my sample have publicly released their annual reports prior to 2012. Only 
five of these NOCs had at least one international board member on their board during this 
period.  
 
Since my purpose is to observe the relationship between the integration of NOCs to the 
international oil market and the presence of international board members, I need to 
eliminate the effect of other systemic factors to the fullest extent possible. Due to the 
exploratory nature of the research question at hand, and the lack of systematic data, I will 
conduct small- N comparative analysis, instead of large-N analysis. Most similar systems 
design (MSSD) and most different systems design (MDSD) are the two most common 
methods that may be applied to small-N analysis as I will do in this thesis. MSSD 
compares cases that are similar in as many characteristics as possible (control variables), 
and differ only in one aspect (the independent variable) to explain the variation among 
these cases (the dependent variable) (Bartolini 1993; Sartori 1991; Skocpol 1984). 
MDSD, on the other hand, compares cases that are as different as possible with regard to 
control variables but show similarity in the main explanatory variable of interest 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). 
 
Depending on the formulation of the research question, both inductive and deductive 
approaches can be used in both MSSD and MDSD (Anckar 2008). The inductive 
approach is about discovery. Research starts without a priori hypothesis, and the 
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hypothesis is generated as the data is collected and analyzed based on an extensive 
literature background (Cavaye 1996). With the inductive approach, theory can be drawn 
from the results of data analysis. Mintzberg (1979) explains his idea of inductive research 
by dividing research into two parts: detective work and creative lap. In the detective work, 
while collecting data, the researcher carries out an analysis by looking for patterns, 
commonalities, and consistencies. The creative leap is entirely about the analysis. The 
researcher can reach a theoretical conclusion by making generalizations from the data. 
 
The deductive approach, on the other hand, is about testing an existing theory. The result 
can either be validating or falsifying the theory (Cavaye 1996). Yin (1989) describes the 
use of a deductive approach in research in three phases. First, research starts with 
generating a hypothesis based on an existing theory. Then, the collection of data about 
the variables of the research takes place. Lastly, in the analysis part, the findings are 
compared to the proposal of the theory, which may result with modification in the theory 
when the findings are inconsistent with the theory.  
 
Whether the dependent variable is constant or varying is another important parameter in 
our chosen methodology. In MSSD, the first step is to choose systems that diverge with 
respect to the independent variable while all other variables are kept constant. This 
assumption, nevertheless, contains a weakness in itself. Since it is impossible to find cases 
that all have constant background variables, any MSSD model can possibly 
overdetermine the dependent variable. Besides MSSD, the literature contains arguments 
that MDSD requires the use of dependent variables that are constant (Landman 2003; 
Sartori 1991). However, Przeworski and Teune (1970) do not support this idea. They 
contend that dependent variables might be constant in the design but do not need to be.  
 
This methodological debate highlights two options to design the methodology for this 
thesis. First, I could use MSSD to select two or more NOCs, which have similar systemic 
features, whereas they differ on their integration into the international oil market. Then, I 
could analyze whether they differ in terms of carrying international members on their 
board. The limited number of available cases makes finding cases with a constant 
background almost impossible. Therefore, the use of MSSD in this thesis could generate 
risk to overdetermine the presence of international board members, as it is not possible to 
find at least two cases that come from mostly similar backgrounds with each other. 
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MDSD offers visibly more advantages for the research question posed in this thesis. Since 
my research question focuses on the independent variable rather than the dependent 
variable, I used a deductive approach in this thesis. Since the method is based on 
eliminating the effect of all control variables, I selected two of these NOCs which have 
the most different control variables: Saudi Aramco and Equinor. I will support my 
arguments emanating from the comparison of these two with anecdotal evidence from the 
remaining three companies. 
 
In the analysis of Saudi Aramco and Equinor through MDSD, the control variables fall 
into two categories in terms of the level of analysis; state level and firm level. State level 
control variables consist of the regime types, the time of first discovery of oil, state’s 
geography, and geopolitical risks. In analyzing the level of market integration, especially 
in the oil sector, the regime type of the country has been one of the most studied variables. 
For instance, Jensen (2003) and Bayulgen (2010) study the relationship between regime 
types and attracting foreign investment, an indicator of market integration. There is also 
an extensive literature on the relationship between resource management and regime type 
(Wantchenkon 1999; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Wright, Frantz and Geddes 2013). 
Therefore, having the regime of states as control variable facilitates the elimination of the 
effect of the regime on the data analysis. 
 
The time of first discovery of oil is another factor which needs to be considered because 
it may affect whether state institutions will shape the governance of oil or the existence 
of oil will shape state institutions. For instance, several middle eastern countries either 
founded around the same time with the discovery of oil, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, 
or the countries that were founded later than the discovery of oil, such as Iran, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and United Arab Emirates. The oil discoveries in the United States 
and the North Sea of Norway took place later than the foundation of the state and its 
institutions.  
 
The geography of a country is also a frequently studied variable when the concern is the 
market integration of oil companies in the country. In the upstream operations, geography 
has an impact on the cost of oil production. Some oil fields need more advanced 
technology to drill, and the cost of drilling in these fields are higher. For instance, while 
the cost of producing a barrel of oil in Venezuela is around $65, the cost of producing oil 
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in Iran is around $20 (Financial Times 2019c). Therefore, some oil companies are more 
dependent on high oil prices to remain profitable. Geopolitical risks over the country are 
also a significant factor in determining the market position of an oil company. The 
production of companies operating in geographically unstable regions is more likely to 
be interrupted by external attacks. The risk is also available for the transportation of the 
oil. For instance, the attack on four oil vessels in the Persian Gulf in May 2019 posed a 
threat to oil trade in the region (The New York Times 2019). 
 
In addition to state-level variables, firm-level control variables are the authority over the 
firm, the initial culture of the firm, and the amount of reserve under the control of firms. 
The authority over the firm is one of the main variables that may have an impact on the 
market position of oil companies. Whether the state is an absolute authority over the 
company or not can change the level of performance of the company. When the state is 
the absolute authority over a company, the company is more likely to put the interest of 
government over profit-seeking as will be explained in the literature review in more 
detail. The initial culture of companies also may shape the market position of these NOCs. 
Although the culture of these NOCs transfer in time, the effect this early culture on the 
corporate governance of these companies should not be underestimated. While most of 
the NOCs were created initially as state-owned enterprises and partially privatized later, 
such as Petrobras and Saudi Aramco. Some others started their operations as private oil 
companies, and nationalized later, such as PDO and Saudi Aramco. Lastly, reserves under 
the control of NOCs should be considered in examining the market integration of these 
companies. 
 
The main independent variable, which is similar across the two cases under inquiry, is 
the change in the level of integration of these NOCs into the international market in time. 
The level of integration cannot be observed by itself. However, as an indicator of the 
change in the integration of a company, change in the diversity in a company can be 
observed.  
 
The dependent variable is the international members on the boards of the NOCs. I expect 
that the increase in the diversity in a company would affect the diversity in the board of 
directors as the major governing body of a company. The diversity in the board can be 
measured through several aspects, such as gender diversity, diversity in age, etc.  
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However, the presence of international board members is assumed to best reflect the 
change that will be measured in this thesis.  
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5. CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Since the emergence of the petroleum industry, the oil market has always been dynamic 
and open to drastic changes. As seen in the historical overview, the main factor affecting 
the oil market are the fluctuations in demand and supply. Any change in the demand and 
supply directly affects oil prices, market share of companies and their revenues. Although 
all oil companies are affected by these changes, some of them are more sensitive 
compared to others. As the literature indicated, NOCs are more vulnerable to changes in 
the market. Therefore, they need to take some measures to preserve and increase their 
market share and revenue. The increase in diversity in these companies (mainly diversity 
in operations, regions, and ownership structure) can be the indicators of measures of these 
companies. Based on the corporate management literature, NOCs have weaker corporate 
governance structures compared to IOCs. Therefore, it is natural to expect that as the 
diversity in the companies increase, the board of these companies will show a change in 
terms of their international members.  
 
Based on this hypothesis, in this chapter, Saudi Aramco and Equinor, two NOCs selected 
as most different cases, will be compared. First of all, the variables that make them as 
different as possible will be explained. After provided that these variables cannot have an 
effect on the study, the independent and dependent variables of these two cases will be 
examined. As an independent variable, the diversification in the company in time will be 
explored. As a dependent variable, the change in the international board members of these 
companies will be observed. After, explaining all the variables of each cases separately, 
all the findings obtained from each case will be analyzed. As a result, whether the 
hypothesis is verified or falsified will be discussed.  
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5.1. Saudi Aramco 
 
 
5.1.1. Control Variables 
 
5.1.1.1. Regime of the country 
 
The home country of Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was founded in 1932 
and is ruled under an absolute monarchy (Wynbrandt 2004). In the Kingdom, ruled by 
the Saudi dynasty, the King is also the head of government. In this system, government 
functions are carried out by Saudi Arabian council of ministers, whose members are 
appointed by the King. In 2016, the council of ministers agreed to the creation of 
Decision-Making Support Center. The council determined the mission of the center as 
the government’s decision-making process in various areas through scientific and 
practical ways. The center is managed by the board of directors, which constitutes five 
members appointed by Royal order. Therefore, just like all the other governance 
mechanisms, the decision-making support center is not an independent entity. No political 
party exists, and no general elections are held in the country. The country consists of 13 
administrative regions, and the mayors under these administrative regions are also 
appointed by the King. The only elections that are held are for municipal councils. In the 
legislation, the Council of Shura plays a role, all the members of which are also appointed 
by the King. The role of the Council of Shura however, is quite limited. Resolutions 
discussed in the Council of Shura come into force only if the council of ministers and the 
King approves these resolutions. The judicial system of Saudi Arabia is based on Sharia 
law, which is founded on Islamic practices. The judiciary in the Kingdom is not 
independent. The decisions taken by the judiciary must be in coordination with the 
executive. Both executive, legislative, and the judiciary system of Saudi Arabia indicate 
that the King is the absolute authority in the country. 
 
 
5.1.1.2. Geographic features and geopolitical risks  
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Saudi Arabia is located in the southwest corner of Asia and is the largest country in the 
Arabian Peninsula. With the size of more than 2,150,000 square kilometers, the Kingdom 
occupies almost 80 percent of the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia MOFA 2017). The 
country is surrounded by the Red Sea in the west and Arabian Gulf on the east. The 
neighbors of Saudi Arabia are Yemen and Oman on the south, the United Arab Emirates 
on the east, and Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait on the north. Deserts compose over 50 percent 
of Saudi Arabian territory (Saudi Arabia MOFA 2017).  
 
The Kingdom is located in a historically unstable region, where countless wars have taken 
place so far. Saudi Arabia became party to some of these wars in the past, for example, 
the Gulf Wars. Today, the Kingdom still takes part in several conflicts in the region, such 
as the proxy conflict with Iran and the Yemeni civil war, in which Saudi Arabia held a 
military intervention. After Houthi insurgents, a group from a Zeydi branch of the Shiite 
sect of Islam captured the Capital of Yemen and forced President Abdrabbuh Mansour 
Hadi to resign, the Saudi-led coalition intervened against Iranian backed Houthi 
insurgents in Yemen (Council on Foreign Relations 2019). While the war in Yemen 
continues, conflicts directly affect the petroleum industry in Saudi Arabia. For instance, 
in May 2019, Yemeni rebel drones attacked two oil pipelines, which caused a temporary 
shutdown of the pipeline that posed a threat for oil supply in the world oil market 
(Bloomberg 2019d). The Saudi government is also on bad terms with Qatar, against 
which it has been employing a blockage since 2017 (BBC 2017). 
 
 
5.1.1.3. Time of the first oil discovery 
 
The increase in oil demand and the fall of supply during WWI created the need to discover 
new oil fields. However, oil companies, especially the Anglo Persian company, did not 
expect to find oil in the Arabian Peninsula (Yergin 1991). Only Frank Holmes, a British 
geologist, had the belief that oil could be found in Bahrain. Holmes gained oil concessions 
from Bahrain in 1923 (Maugeri 2006). As a result of several initiatives, an American 
company, Gulf Oil showed an interest in Bahrain. However, the company was a part 
American group in the Turkish Petroleum Company. According to Red Line Agreement 
signed by the members of the group, any of the members can act independently in the 
agreed region, which contains both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Since the partners of Gulf 
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Oil did not agree to operate in the region so that The Gulf had to hand over its concessions 
in Bahrain to Standard of California (SOCAL) (Yergin 1991). Although the British 
government was against the presence of American companies in the region at first, the 
government later accepted SOCAL to operate in the region in 1929. In 1932, the first oil 
was found in Bahrain, which opened the way for further discoveries in the region. 
 
Less than a year later after the discovery of the first oil in Bahrain, the first step of oil 
discoveries in Saudi Arabia was taken in 1933, only a year after the foundation of the 
state, with a concession the agreement signed between the Saudi government and SOCAL 
(Yergin 1991). To manage the agreement, a subsidiary company, the California Arabian 
Standard Oil Company (CASOC), was established. As a result of the explorations that 
started right after the establishment of the company, the drilling began in 1935, and 
finally, the company discovered a commercial quantity of oil in Saudi Arabia (Maugeri 
2006). Since the discovery of oil coincided with the early years of the establishment of 
the country, Saudi Arabia’s economy was built primarily on oil.  
 
 
5.1.1.4. Initial culture of the firm  
 
Starting from the first drilling, CASOC (today’s Saudi Aramco) had steadily increased 
its performance and discovered several hydrocarbon fields until 1944. At the end of the 
ten years of operations, oil production in Saudi Arabia reached almost 500,000 barrels 
per day. In 1944, the company was renamed as Aramco (Business Insider 2017). In 1960, 
the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was established to monitor the activities 
of the companies in Saudi Arabia and to develop policies about the oil industry. Aramco 
operated as a private company until 1973, when the Saudi government bought a 25 
percent interest of the company. The share of the Saudi government increased to 60 
percent in the next year.  In 1980, the company was nationalized entirely, and, in 1984, 
Aramco had its first Saudi President, which was followed by the first Saudi CEO in 1988 
(Business Insider 2017). The company was renamed from Aramco to Saudi Aramco in 
1988 to reflect this ownership change (Saudi Aramco 2018a). Lastly, in 2000, the 
Supreme Council for Petroleum of and Minerals was established in order to supervise the 
oil and gas sector in Saudi Arabia. The council consists of royal family members, 
government ministers and industry leaders. The Supreme Council actively takes part in 
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the decision-making process in the oil industry. Therefore, the council consolidates state 
control over Saudi Aramco. Today, Saudi Arabia is the largest petroleum exporter in the 
world (Forbes 2018). The petroleum sector comprises 87 percent of budget revenues, 42 
percent of GDP, and 90 percent of export earnings (Forbes 2018). The 2018 budget of 
Saudi Arabia was $261 billion, the largest budget of the country ever.  
 
The historical dependency on oil, however, has created problems for the country in the 
long run. Since the Kingdom generates most of its income from the oil sector and public 
sector, the economy of the country turns out to be highly sensitive to volatility in oil 
prices. For decades, expatriate workers (expats) have played roles in the Saudi economy. 
Expats constitute almost one-third of Saudi Arabia’s 34 million population and more than 
80 percent of the workforce in the private sector (Financial Times 2018b). The level of 
unemployment for Saudi citizens runs high, and the unemployment rate in the first quarter 
of 2019 was 12.7 percent. This rate is both due to the lack of job opportunities, especially 
in the private sector, and the distortions the minimum citizen income the Saudi 
government distributes to its citizens creates in the job market (Saudi Gazette 2019). To 
overcome the problems arising from oil dependence, the Kingdom has been trying to 
imply policies for diversification through five-year development plans since 1970, but 
the plans have not generated the expected result (Independent 2018a). Oil prices started 
to decline in the second half of 2014, when the price was around $110 and reached $36 
in January 2016, the lowest point since the 2001 economic crisis (Macrotrends 2019).  
The sharp decline in the prices accelerated the actions of Saudi Arabia to decrease the 
dependency on oil for revenue, and in 2016, the release of Vision 20302, became one of 
Saudi Arabia’s most prominent efforts. The plan focuses on three critical areas, which are 
to generate revenue outside of the oil sector, to decrease government spending and to 
diversify national wealth (The Guardian 2016). 
 
 
5.1.1.5. Amount of reserves and production  
 
According to the latest annual report of Saudi Aramco (2017), the total amount of reserves 
under the control of Saudi Aramco was 332,897 mmboe, which consists of 256,757 
                                                 
2 For detailed information about Vision 2030, please see: https://vision2030.gov.sa/en 
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mmboe crude oil, 36,939 mmboe natural gas, 35,097 mmboe NGLs, and 4,124 mmboe 
condensate. Saudi Aramco accounts for 16 percent of the world’s total reserves (OPEC 
2018). According to the report, the total amount of hydrocarbon production of Saudi 
Aramco was 13.1 mmboe/d, and the share of crude oil production in the total amount was 
10.2 mb/d in 2017. Considering that the world’s total oil supply was 97.36 mmboe/d, 
Saudi Aramco is the provider of more than 10 percent of the global oil supply (IEA 2018). 
The cost of producing a barrel of oil in Saudi Arabia is nearly $9, which is one of the 
lowest costs of oil production in the world (Financial Times 2019c). Today, with its 
$111,1 billion net annual income from $355,9 billion annual revenue in 2018, Saudi 
Aramco is officially the most profitable company in the world (The Guardian 2019). 
 
 
5.1.1.6. Authority over the firm 
 
Saudi Aramco sustains its operations under the control of the Saudi government. The 
board of Saudi Aramco includes four ministers, namely the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy and Planning and the Minister of 
Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources of Saudi Arabia. Prior to this position, the energy 
minister, Khalid A. Al-Falih, served as President and CEO of the company from 2009 to 
2015 (Saudi Aramco 2017). Since 2015, he served as both Energy Minister and Chairman 
of Saudi Aramco. The close relations between Saudi Aramco and the energy ministry 
appears especially in financial relations. Traditionally Saudi Aramco finances ministerial 
expenses, including the luxury spending of Khalid A. Al-Falih (Financial Times 2019b). 
Besides funding the energy ministry, Saudi Aramco generates the majority of the state’s 
revenues and invests in infrastructures such as building schools, hospitals, and sports 
stadiums, at the expense to the company (Financial Times 2019b). 
 
 
5.1.2. Independent Variable 
 
The diversification attempts of Saudi Aramco takes place in three ways. The first way of 
diversification is to increase its operations in midstream and downstream levels. The 
second way of diversification is to increase its operations in different regions other than 
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Saudi Arabia. The last way of diversification for Saudi Aramco is to increase the diversity 
in the company’s ownership. Until 1980, when Saudi Arabia bought 100 percent of the 
interests in Aramco, the company had operated as oil-producing and oil-exporting 
company in Saudi Arabia (Sarbu 2014).  
 
As mentioned earlier, Saudi Aramco was established as an IOC in the beginning, and the 
company was nationalized in 1980. The first change in the ownership structure of the 
company took place as a consolidation of state authority over the company. Therefore, 
nationalization was a retreating step in terms of the company’s ownership diversification. 
A short while after the nationalization, in 1984, Saudi Aramco established an equally 
owned domestic joint venture called Saudi Aramco Mobil Refinery Company (Samref) 
with Yanbu Refining Company (a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon Mobil Corporation) 
(ExxonMobil 2017). Establishment of the joint venture was the first attempt of Saudi 
Aramco as a NOC to diversify its operations. In 1989, a year later from the official 
establishment of Saudi Aramco, the company took another step in a way to go beyond oil 
production, and to become a vertically integrated company. Saudi Aramco created a 
refinery joint venture called Star Enterprises, which later became Motiva, with Texaco 
and Shell (The New York Times 1989). The establishment of Motiva was an attempt to 
both operational and regional diversity for Saudi Aramco. In 2017, Saudi Aramco became 
the sole owner of Motiva, North America’s biggest crude oil refinery at Porth Arthur, 
Texas (Saudi Gazette 2017).  
 
Throughout the 1990s, Saudi Aramco had continued its investments in refinery both in 
Saudi Arabia and internationally. In 1991, the company bought 35 percent interest in the 
SsangYong Oil Refining Company (renamed S-Oil in 2000) in South Korea (S-Oil 2019). 
The major step of Saudi Aramco in refinery investments took place in 1993. Saudi 
Arabian Marketing and Refinery Company (Samarec), the biggest refinery company of 
Saudi Arabia, was dissolved, and Saudi Aramco took over the assets of Samarec 
(Shammas 2000). As a result of its merge with Samarec, Saudi Aramco took over the 
interests of Samarec in Saudi Aramco Shell Refining Company (Sasref). In April 2019, 
Saudi Aramco agreed with Shell to buy its shares in Sasref, which constitutes 50 percent 
of the company (Reuters 2019a). As part of its international refinery investments, in 1994, 
Saudi Aramco acquired 40 percent interest in Petron Corporation, the largest crude oil 
refiner and marketer in the Philippines (UPI 1993). Following Petron Corporation, Saudi 
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Aramco continued its international refinery investments in Europe. In 1996, the company 
bought 50 percent of the interests in Greek refiner Motor Oil (Hellas) Corinth Refineries 
and its marketing affiliate, Avin oil Industrial Commercial and Maritime Oil Company 
(Motor Oil 2011). The last refinery investment of Saudi Aramco during the 1990s was 
Saudi Aramco Base Oil Company (Luberef) in Saudi Arabia. In 1998, Saudi Aramco 
bought 70 percent of interests in Luberef, a refinery joint venture established between the 
Saudi government and Mobil Petroleum Company (today called Exxon Mobil). In 2007, 
Saudi Aramco bought the remaining 30 percent of interests from Exxon Mobil and 
became the sole owner of the company (Arab News 2007a). As a result of all these 
attempts, based on direct ownership, Aramco today is the world’s fourth-largest refiner 
behind ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and Sinopec (Ramady 2017). 
 
Throughout the 2000s, Saudi Aramco continued to diversify its operations by entering 
into the petrochemical industry both domestically and internationally. The company 
created several joint ventures with oil majors. Saudi Aramco entered into petrochemical 
industry with Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Company (Petro Rabigh) in 2005 (Amy 
Myers Jaffe and Elass 2007). Petro Rabigh was established as a joint venture based in 
Saudi Arabia between Saudi Aramco and Japan’s Sumitomo Chemical. In 2007, Saudi 
Aramco, Exxon Mobile, and Fujian Petrochemical Company established Fujian Refining 
& Petrochemical Company in China (Aramco Expats 2007). Saudi Aramco initiated 
another refinery and petrochemicals company with Total in 2008. The joint venture is 
called Saudi Aramco Total Refining and Petrochemical (Satorp) (TOTAL 2019). Both of 
these three early petrochemical investments of Saudi Aramco were created as integrated 
companies. In other words, in these companies, the processes of petroleum refining and 
petrochemical manufacturing are co-located. The feedstock for producing petrochemicals 
comes from the same crude oil that produces petrol and other fuels. Therefore, integrating 
the processes helps achieve maximum utilization of resources.  
 
In addition to the integrated refinery and petrochemical companies, in 2011, Saudi 
Aramco initiated a chemical company with the partnership of Dow Chemical company in 
Saudi Arabia (Dow 2011). The joint venture called Sadara Chemical company was one 
of the biggest steps of Saudi Aramco investing in downstream operations to increase 
diversification. Sadara is the world’s largest integrated chemical complex, with a 
production capacity to produce nearly 8 million metric tons of olefin, polyolefin, and an 
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extensive range of high-value diversified “specialty” chemicals and plastics (Sadara 
2011). Saudi Aramco Chairman of the Board of Directors, Khalid A. Al-Falih, explains 
the significance of the creation of Sadara for Saudi Aramco as following:  
 
"Sadara represents a bold undertaking for both Saudi Aramco and Dow. For 
us at Saudi Aramco, it is a major driver in achieving our goals of greater 
integration and value addition. Sadara represents the concrete realization of 
our distinct, yet complementary, corporate visions" (Aramco Expats 2016). 
 
The investments of Saudi Aramco to integrated refinery and petrochemicals furthered 
with the creation of a joint venture with Dutch advanced chemical company, Lanxess, in 
2016. The joint venture, called Arlanxeo, created as a specialized synthetic rubber 
company in Netherland (Lanxess 2016). Three years from the establishment of Arlanxeo, 
Saudi Aramco became the sole owner of the company (Saudi Aramco 2018b). In 2018, 
Saudi Aramco agreed with Petronas, the national oil company of Malaysia, to create a 
refinery and petrochemical joint venture called Pengerang Refining & Petrochemical 
(PRefChem) (Petronas 2018). 
 
In 2018, Saudi Aramco agreed with National Oilwell Varco (NOV) to create a joint 
venture to set up an integrated on-shore rig and equipment manufacturing and after-
market facility. NOV is a provider of equipment and components used in oil and gas 
drilling and production operations, oil field services, and supply chain integration services 
to the upstream oil and gas industry. With the joint venture, called Arabian Rig 
Manufacturing (ARM), Saudi Aramco aimed to develop oil field services within Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Aramco Development Company chief executive officer Ziad Al-Murshed 
explains the significance of ARM for Saudi Aramco as such: “This joint venture with 
NOV is a major step toward localizing oil field equipment manufacturing and after-
market services, starting with rig manufacturing” (NS Energy 2018). 
 
The biggest of all these diversification attempts through petrochemicals took place with 
Sabic agreement of Saudi Aramco. According to the agreement, Saudi Aramco acquires 
majority stakes of Sabic, which is a major global chemical company with yearly revenues 
of $45 billion  (Sabic 2018). In March 2019, Saudi Aramco signed an agreement to buy 
70 percent of the company held by the Saudi state worth $69.1bn (Forbes 2019a). The 
deal is critical not only for Saudi Aramco but also the Saudi government. The proceeds 
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from the sale of Sabic will provide part of the funds for the Saudi government to carry 
out its economic reform plan (Forbes 2019a). For Saudi Aramco, Sabic will be the 
chemical hand of the company, creating synergies in operations, and an important step in 
the way to the IPO of Saudi Aramco (Forbes 2019a).  
 
In addition to these joint ventures, to be able to preserve its share in the Asian market, 
Saudi Aramco had a partnership with Japan on oil stockpiling since 2011. In 2017, the 
company agreed with Japan to increase its stockpiling capacity in the country (Oil Price 
2017). Besides Japan, the company also agreed with South Korea to have crude oil storage 
in 2019 (Arab Weekly 2019). As part of these investment initiatives, in 2019, Saudi 
Aramco also agreed with South Korean oil refiner Hyundai Oilbank to buy 17 percent of 
its shares (Reuters 2019b). Another attempt of Saudi Aramco to grow its business beyond 
oil is the deal with Sempra Energy again in 2019. According to the deal, Saudi Aramco 
will buy 25 percent of Port Arthur liquified natural gas (LNG) export project in Texas 
(Financial Times 2019e). 
 
Besides these solid steps, Saudi Aramco signed several memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) agreements with several international companies and continues its negotiations 
for future cooperation. The company announced that Saudi Aramco considers investing 
in Shale operations with Equinor, which could be the first overseas joint venture of Saudi 
Aramco on gas explorations (Bloomberg 2019c). Saudi Aramco pursues another 
negotiation this time with Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries to get a minority stake 
in the Indian Company’s refining and petrochemical operations (Business Today 2019).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of section, Saudi Aramco sustained its diversification 
attempts in three ways. The joint ventures are the examples of diversification of 
operations and regional diversification. The last way of diversification, diversifying 
ownership of the company became an issue for Saudi Aramco in 2016, for the first time 
after the nationalization of the company. Mohammed bin Salman, deputy crown prince 
of the Kingdom, announced that the Saudi government was considering listing 5 percent 
of Aramco shares in the international stock market (The Economist 2016). The IPO is 
expected to be the largest IPO ever in world history. In the announcement Prince 
Mohammed commented on the significance of transparency of the company by stating 
that “Taking the group public would create more transparency and counter corruption, if 
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any, that may be circling around Aramco” (The Economist 2016). As a matter of fact, for 
the first time in history, Saudi Aramco officially listed its cost of oil production per barrel 
in 2018.  
 
Although the IPO has not taken place yet because of the concerns over valuation, the 
current price of oil and litigation risks, the prospective IPO of Aramco in world markets 
highlighted the need to credibly signal Aramco’s quality to foreign investors (Financial 
Times 2019d). Therefore, since the announcement of the IPO, both the Saudi government 
and Saudi Aramco have taken several concrete steps. In 2017, the Saudi government 
established a new fiscal regime to regulate its records according to the International 
Financial Recording Standards. As part of this new regime, the government cut the tax 
on the company’s income from 85 percent to 50 percent (Reuters 2017). The massive 
amount of taxes, which is even higher than the royalty payments to the government, 
decreases the attractiveness of the company to possible investors.  
 
Besides the 2017 tax cut, the government and Saudi Aramco officialized the legal 
document which administers operations and the structure of the company. In 2019, Saudi 
Aramco released its bond prospectus, a document that details the operations and finances 
for potential investors in an IPO, especially to elucidate relations with the energy ministry 
of the Kingdom (Forbes 2019b). The prospectus reveals that in 2018, Aramco paid $101.7 
billion as income tax and royalty payment, and an additional $60 billion in dividends 
(Saudi Aramco 2019). After all the discussions and delays, the date for the IPO has been 
announced for 2021 (CNBC 2018). All these steps to increase transparency, attempts to 
change the legal status of the company from state enterprise to joint-stock company and 
even the statements of Saudi officials signal that Saudi Aramco is open to transform its 
ownership structure in the near future, which is a facilitative factor for its integration into 
the global market (Financial Times 2018a). The revenue from this IPO is also key to 
MBS’s plans to diversify the Saudi economy, and his planned investments to boost Saudi 
employment. 
 
The future IPO has not only transformed relations between Saudi Aramco and the 
government, but has also fostered the mentioned investments of the company in various 
operations, especially in petrochemicals, since 2016. Saudi Officials claim that Saudi 
Aramco’s worth reaches $2 trillion, but various analyses indicate that the numbers are not 
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realistic, and the company can reach that value only if the oil prices rise above $100 
(Bloomberg 2019a). Saudi Aramco decided to increase the weight of operations other 
than oil to convince the investors that Saudi Aramco is ready to retain its market value 
even after the oil. The energy minister, Khalid A. Al-Falih, explains the intention of Saudi 
Aramco as such, “We are no longer going to be inward-looking and focused only on 
monetizing the Kingdom’s resources… Going forward, the world is going to be Saudi 
Aramco’s playground” (Financial Times 2019a). 
 
Table 1. Major Diversification Attempts of Saudi Aramco 
 
 
 
 
5.1.3. Dependent Variable 
 
Saudi Aramco was an international oil company until its nationalization in 1980. The 
shareholders of Saudi Aramco before its nationalization were major American 
companies, namely Exxon, Texaco, Socal, and Mobil. Therefore, the board of Saudi 
Aramco was mainly composed of non-Saudi members who were representatives of these 
shareholders (Ramady 2017). The first two Saudi members were appointed to the board 
in 1959. One of these members was Abdullah Tariki, the first Saudi Oil Minister 
appointed by King Saud. When he was appointed as a board member, he was Director-
General of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. The second Saudi appointee was Hafiz 
Diversification in the Company Year
Establishment of Motiva (The First Refinery) 1989
Merger with Samarec (Refinery) 1993
Establishment of Petro Rabigh (The First Petrochemical) 2005
Establishment of Sadara Chemicals 2011
Announcement of IPO 2016
Merge with Sabic Petrochemicals 2019
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Wahbah, an Advisor to the late King Abdul-Aziz and a former Envoy to the U.K (Ramady 
2017). 
 
Following the nationalization, the first major change made in the board of Saudi Aramco 
was in 1984. Ali Al-Naimi was appointed as the first Saudi president of Saudi Aramco 
(MEED 2017). Before being appointed president, Al-Naimi has served for Saudi Aramco 
for almost 30 years. Four years after the presidency, he was appointed as the first Saudi 
CEO of Saudi Aramco. The same year, Saudi Aramco had the first Saudi Chairman. 
Hisham Nazer, Minister of Petroleum and Minerals of the time, became the Chairman of 
Saudi Aramco (Aramco Expats 2015). With Hisham Nazer, the appointment of Minister 
of Petroleum and Minerals as Chairman of Saudi Aramco became a tradition for the 
company. Ali Al Naimi (1995–2015) and Khalid Al Falih (2015-present) became the 
subsequent chairmen of Saudi Aramco (Ramady 2017).  
 
The changes in the top positions of the company during the 1980s were signs of the 
Saudization of the company. As a major corporate governance body, the board was also 
shaped according to Saudization. Instead of international members, several Saudi 
government officials became a part of the board. However, in its rebirth as a Saudi 
company in every sense, Saudi Aramco did not cut all relations with the former 
consortium. Evidently, the board was not entirely transformed, although Saudi Aramco 
was 100 percent nationalized. After the reorganization of the board in 1988, two of the 
previous shareholder representatives and a banker were appointed as board members — 
namely Clifton Garvin, Harold Haynes, and Rodney B. Wagner (Shammas 2000).  
 
Before being appointed as a board member of Saudi Aramco, Clifton Garvin served as 
Chairman and CEO of Exxon (former shareholder of Aramco) from 1975 to 1986. He 
was in office when the oil crisis erupted during the 1970s. Garvin was in belief that the 
world is running out of oil. Therefore, he focused on the diversification of operations 
(The Wall Street Journal 2016). In 1981, during one of his interviews, Garvin stated that 
the U.S. would need to rely more heavily on nuclear power and develop synthetic fuels. 
Since Garvin had the idea that oil was shrinking, during his term at Exxon, the company 
entered into electronic office equipment business, which later terminated after his term 
came to an end (The Wall Street Journal 2016). As a proponent of diversification, he 
served on the board of Saudi Aramco until 1998.  
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Harold J. Haynes was another international board member of Saudi Aramco after the 
nationalization. Haynes became the president of Standard Oil Company of California 
(today called Chevron) in 1969. Then, he served as the CEO and the Chairman of the 
company from 1974 to 1981. Standard Oil was one of the shareholders of Saudi Aramco 
during the time of Haynes. He served on the board of Saudi Aramco until 2001.  
 
Rodney B. Wagner was the other international member after the reorganization of the 
board of Saudi Aramco. Wagner was an international banker at J.P. Morgan Chase & 
Company. He was an important figure in handling a major debt issue in Saudi Arabia. He 
brokered a loan package for Saudi Arabia that preserved its liquidity after the first Gulf 
War with Iraq (The New York Times 2005). Wagner served on the Board of Saudi 
Aramco until his death in 2005.  
 
In 1996, Clifton Garvin was replaced by James W. Kinnear, who served as the president 
and the CEO of Texaco (today called Chevron) from 1987 to 1993. During his term in 
Texaco, Kinnear was known for his efforts to restore relations with shareholders. He 
aimed to increase the openness of the company. Mr. Kinnear emphasized this mission 
with these words: “I am absolutely determined to change the image of this company” 
(Bennett 1987). The focus of Kinnear was mainly on innovation and technology in the 
oilfields and laboratories.  
 
In 2001, Harold J. Haynes was replaced by Victor Beghini, former president of the U.S.-
based Marathon Oil Company until 1999 (Arab News 2001). He served on the board of 
Saudi Aramco for six years. In 2007, two new international members were appointed as 
replacement of Rodney B. Wagner and Victor Beghini. One of the new appointees was 
Peter Woicke. He was a former managing director at the World Bank. The second 
international member Mark Moody Stuart, the former Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, 
was appointed in 2007 and still remains a member of the board (Arab News 2007b). The 
business principles of Stuart can generally be explained under two categories: 
partnerships and engagement. He strongly supports cross-sector initiatives, anything that 
gets businesses working together and preferably with others. The other principle of Stuart 
is about engagement with other actors. He explains this principle as such:  
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"There is no good standing on your side of the fence and telling everyone 
what you think about it. You really have to sit down and try and understand 
what it is that bothers other people" (Balch 2014). 
 
In 2010, James W. Kinnear was replaced by David J. O’Reilly, former CEO and 
Chairman of Chevron Corporation from 2000 to 2009 (World Oil 2010). The major step 
of O’Reilly was to engineer the merge of Chevron with Texaco during the late 2000s. 
The merger created the second-largest integrated oil company in the U.S. During his 
presidency over the new company, Chevron Texaco, O’Reilly concentrated on energy 
generation and the manufacturing and marketing of chemicals in addition to regular oil 
and gas operations (CNN Money 2005). Kinnear became the first member of Saudi 
Aramco’s board with prior experience on petrochemicals. Unsurprisingly, the time he 
was appointed to the board of Saudi Aramco was also the time that Saudi Aramco started 
to make major investments in petrochemicals.  
 
In 2013, James W. Kinnear was replaced by Andrew F. J. Gould, the former CEO and the 
Chairman of Schlumberger Oilfield Services from 2003 to 2011 (Amy Myers Jaffe and 
Elass 2007). During his time at Schlumberger, Gould led the company to acquire Smith 
International and created a bigger oil field service company (The Wall Street Journal 
2011). He is credited with rededicating Schlumberger to oil field services, after the 
company’s failure to expand in information technology. Gould is still on the board of 
Saudi Aramco, and the company made investments in oilfield services during his term. 
For instance, Saudi Aramco created ARM, a joint venture of manufacturing facilities, in 
2018, after he was appointed to the board.  
 
In 2018, following the announcement that Saudi Aramco will arrange an IPO, the 
company rearranged its board structure and increased the number of international board 
members from three to five. Peter Woicke left the board, and three new international 
members were appointed (Arab News 2018). The rearrangement in the board structure 
was one of the preparations of Saudi Aramco to the future IPO. In the previous form of 
the board, government officials constituted seven out of ten members. With this change, 
the ratio of government officials and also Saudi members dropped to six out of eleven. 
The new form of the board aimed to give the signal that shareholders will be represented 
on the board. However, the changes in the board are not only signal for future 
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shareholders. The new appointees are also strategic names for the recent operational 
strategy of Saudi Aramco. 
 
One of the new board members appointed in 2018 is Andrew N. Liveris. He served as 
Chairman and CEO of the Dow Chemical Company from 2004 to 2017 (Aramco Expats 
2018). In 2011, when Saudi Aramco created a petrochemical joint venture (Sadara) with 
Dow Chemical, Liveris was the CEO of the Dow Chemicals, and he positioned Dow as 
the largest foreign investor in Saudi Arabia (Financial Times 2018c). During the 
establishment of Sadara, Liveris focused on the significance of the joint venture for the 
diversification in the operations of Saudi Aramco.  
 
“Sadara is an extraordinary and unique venture that will build upon the 
strengths of both Dow and Saudi Aramco to deliver the diversified and 
specialty materials and chemicals needed to drive growth in the entire region 
and beyond" (Sadara 2011). 
 
Again, during the time Liveris was at Dow Chemicals, the company became the first 
foreign company to be awarded a Saudi trading license in 2016 (Reuters 2016). The 
license allows Dow Chemicals to own 100% of any company it establishes in Saudi 
Arabia, rather than requiring it to have a joint venture with a local partner. Considering 
the recent investments of Saudi Aramco in petrochemicals, Liveris seems to be a critical 
figure for the petrochemical business of Saudi Aramco. 
 
Another international board member of Saudi Aramco appointed in 2018 is Peter L. Cella. 
He served as president and CEO of Chevron Philips Chemical Company from 2011 to 
2017. Besides, he served in many other petrochemical companies, such as BASF 
Corporation, INEOS Nitriles, and Innovene. Cella also held various positions in BP. He 
served on the boards of Chevron Philips Chemical Company and the American Chemistry 
Council (Aramco Expats 2018). The extensive experience of Cella in petrochemicals is a 
fundamental criteria for his appointment to the board since Saudi Aramco has been trying 
to increase the share of petrochemicals within the company.   
 
The last name appointed to the board in 2018 is Lynn Laverty Elsenhans. Elsenhans 
became the first woman board member of Saudi Aramco (The Guardian 2018b). Forbes 
named Elsenhans as one of the most powerful women in the world (Forbes 2008). Her 
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appointment to the board gives two signals. For the first time in its 86 years of history, 
Saudi Aramco gave the signal of gender diversification of its board. Second, by 
appointing a woman member on the board of the biggest company of the state, the 
Kingdom signals the change in the conservative culture, even if the change takes place 
slowly.  
 
Elsenhans served as Chairwoman, President, and CEO of Sunoco, a manufacturer and 
marketer of petrochemical products, from 2008 to 2012. Before Sunoco, she served for 
Shell, one of the major partners of Saudi Aramco, for almost 30 years. During her time at 
Sunoco, her biggest move was to decrease the refining business of Sunoco and to focus 
on retail business since the refinery business caused a loss for the company (Forbes 2008).  
 
Table 2. The Change in the Number of Intl. Board Members of Saudi Aramco  
 
 
 
 
Period Number of Board Members Number of Intl Board Members Ratio of Intl Members 
1988- 2013 12 3 25%
2013- 2018 10 3 30%
2018-present 11 5 45%
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5.2. Equinor 
 
 
5.2.1. Control Variables 
 
5.2.1.1. Regime of the country 
 
The history of Norway, the home country of Equinor, dates back to the ninth century. In 
the recent past, the country declared independence from Sweden in 1905. However, the 
present constitution of Norway was written in 1814, long before the independence of the 
country. The constitution is affected by British political traditions, the ideas behind the 
French Revolution and the constitution of the United States. Accordingly, the official 
regime in Norway is a parliamentary, democratic, and representative constitutional 
monarchy. In this system, the King has symbolic political power. The executive function 
in Norway is exercised by the cabinet and council of state, led by a prime minister. After 
the elections on January 20, 2019, the cabinet was formed by a coalition of four political 
parties. The legislative function of Norway is carried out by both the government and the 
Storting, the unicameral parliament elected within a multi-party system. Lastly, the 
judicial system of Norway is independent of executive and legislative bodies. The legal 
system is a combination of customary law, civil law, and common law traditions.  
 
 
5.2.1.2. Geographic features and geopolitical risks 
 
Norway is a Northern European country, located in the western and northern part of the 
Scandinavian Peninsula. The country shares the largest border with Sweden. The other 
countries that Norway shares border with are Finland and Russia. Other than these 
countries, Norway borders the Barents Sea in the northeast, North Atlantic Ocean in the 
west and Northern Sea, where the first oil discovered, and Skagerret inlet in the south. 
With over 25,000 kilometers, Norway has one the longest coastlines in the world. 
Therefore, setting the maritime boundaries has been a critical issue for Norway. The 
country established the maritime boundaries with its neighbors, Denmark, Russia, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Harsson and Preiss 2012). Today, the continental shelf 
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of Norway is a significant source for oil and gas, and also the wind power for domestic 
consumption and mainly for Europe. 
 
As opposed to Saudi Arabia, Norway has been a stable country since the end of WWI. 
Almost the only concern the country has as a threat to its security is the possible terrorist 
attacks. The attacks by a right-wing extremist in 2011, which resulted in 77 causalities, 
brought religious extremism as one of the primary concerns of the country (CNN 2019). 
Besides domestic issues, the aggressive behaviors of Russia and its growing presence in 
the Norwegian sea can be a concern for Norway maritime security, but there is no 
concrete sign in the behavior of Norway, indicating a perception of threat by Russia 
(Bojesson and Coller 2016).  
 
 
5.2.1.3. Time of the first oil discovery 
 
The first oil explorations in Norway started in the 1960s, long after the establishment of 
the regime in the country. In 1962, Philips Petroleum applied Norwegian authorities to 
get a license to start exploration in the North Sea in exchange for $160,000 per month 
(Norwegian Petroleum 2019c). The Norwegian government perceived the demand as 
giving an exclusive right to Philip Petroleum by handing over its continental shelf to only 
one company. Therefore, the government decided that these areas can be opened to 
exploration only if more than company takes part in operations. In 1963, the Norwegian 
government declared the continental shelf of the Norwegian state in order to consolidate 
the authority of the Norwegian government (symbolically the King) on the natural 
resources founded in the shelf. The law also authorizes only the government to give 
license for explorations. However, due to being the sovereign in the continental shelf, the 
Norwegian government should also agree with its neighbors for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf. After reaching an agreement with Denmark and the U.K. in 1965, 
Norway started to provide licenses for explorations in the continental shelf of the country. 
The first discovery took place in 1969, and the production from the field started in 1971. 
Although foreign companies started their exploration activities, the Norwegian 
government decided to take control in a short while and in 1972 established Equinor 
(formerly known as Statoil, which changed its name in 2018) as the only owner of the 
company. Today the petroleum sector comprises 21 percent of state revenue, 16 percent 
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of GDP and 40 percent of total exports (Norwegian Petroleum 2019d). The ratio of people 
employed in the petroleum industry in Norway is only six percent of the total employment 
in Norway (Norwegian Petroleum 2018) 
 
 
5.2.1.4. Initial culture of the firm 
 
From 1973-1985, the Norwegian government had given more than 50 percent of 
Norway’s petroleum development licenses to Statoil. With this arrangement, the portion 
of Statoil’s cash flow in the gross national product started to get bigger. Therefore, in 
1985, the participating interest of Norwegian state in the petroleum industry was divided 
into two: one part was connected to Statoil, and one was to State’s Direct Financial 
Interest (SDFI), a judicial entity managed by Statoil (Gordon and Stenvoll 2007).  
 
Despite the existence of a NOC (Equinor) in Norway, the government pursues a policy 
of competition and diversification players in the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Especially 
since 2000, there has been a significant increase in the number of companies operating in 
the continental shelf of Norway. While the number was 24 in 1999, the number of 
companies operating in the Norwegian Continental Shelf reached 56 in 2013. According 
to the most recent data, in 2018, the number was 39 which is composed of two large 
Norwegian Companies, four majors, 21 medium-sized companies, 11 small-sized 
companies, and two utilities (Norwegian Petroleum 2019a). These companies operate in 
both the exploration and production in the continental shelf. The policies of competition 
and diversification prevent Equinor from being a monopoly in the Norwegian petroleum 
industry.  
 
Although the Norwegian government pursues a policy open to foreign investment and 
diversity, the latest move of Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund created a negative impact 
in terms of oil investments. In 2019, the wealth fund, the world’s largest wealth fund with 
$1trillion of assets, announced that the fund will phase out of its investments in oil and 
gas companies (Reuters 2019c). The reason behind the decision is the policy of increasing 
the share of renewables in investments so that to decrease dependency on oil prices. The 
only exceptions for the decision are Shell and BP since these companies are involved in 
renewables (Reuters 2019c). Although the decision is compatible with the policy of the 
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country, it created a negative signal to international oil and gas companies for their 
operations in Norway.  
 
 
5.2.1.5. Amount of reserves and production 
 
According to the Annual Report of Equinor (2018), the total amount of reserves under 
the control of Equinor is 6,175 mmboe, which consists of 2,558 mmboe oil and 
condensate, 393 mmboe NGL and 3,222 mmboe natural gas. The total amount of reserves 
under the control of Equinor is only one sixty of the reserves under the control of Saudi 
Aramco. The report indicates that the total amount of hydrocarbon production of Equinor 
was 2.11 mmboe/d in 2018. The cost of producing a barrel of oil is around $21 - at least 
two times higher than the cost for Saudi Aramco (Financial Times 2019c). In 2018, the 
annual revenue of Equinor was $79,5 billion, and the net annual income of the company 
was $7,5 billion (Equinor 2018). The share of net annual income in the annual revenue is 
one-tenth, whereas the ratio in Saudi Aramco is nearly one third.  
 
 
5.2.1.6. Authority over the firm 
 
Within the diverse ownership structure of the company, unlike Saudi Aramco, the 
Norwegian state is not the absolute authority over the company. Equinor has a well-
established governance structure based on Norwegian law. Besides the internal rules, 
since the company is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Equinor is also 
subject to NYSE’s listing rules (Equinor 2019a). The corporate governance structure of 
the company is composed of general meeting, nomination committee, external auditor, 
corporate assembly, the board of directors, corporate executive body, and corporate audit.  
 
The general meeting is the supreme body of the company. All the shareholders are invited 
to annual general meetings, and each share owns an equal right to vote at the meetings. 
Decisions of shareholders should comply with Norwegian law or Equinor’s articles of 
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association3. In the election of people by shareholders, individuals that get the most vote 
gets elected. However, certain decisions such as resolutions to abandon preferential rights 
related to shares, merging or demerging, change in the articles of association of Equinor, 
and changes in the amount of share capital, should be accepted by two thirds of the total 
number of shareholders at the meeting in which at least two thirds of shares are 
represented. Members of the two bodies of Equinor, nomination committee and external 
auditor, are elected in the general meetings by shareholders. The nomination committee 
is responsible for preparing recommendations for the elections of shareholder-elected 
members of both corporate assembly and board of directors in annual general meetings. 
The external auditor is an independent body, and the primary duty of the external auditor 
is to control the firm’s competence, capacity, local and international availability and the 
size of the fee.  
 
Corporate Assembly is another body, mainly responsible for the election of the members 
of the board of directors. Companies subject to Norwegian Public Limited Liability 
Companies Act should elect the members of corporate assembly if the number of 
employees of the company is more than 200. Therefore, two-thirds of the Corporate 
Assembly of Equinor is elected through an Annual General Meeting and one-third by its 
employees. Another significant part of corporate governance, Corporate Executive Body 
is responsible for the operations of the company. Moreover, the body proposes strategies 
for the company. Lastly, the corporate audit has a duty to monitor the management of the 
business. 
 
Both the earlier governance strategy of the Norwegian state and current governance 
structure of Equinor aims at the division of roles and responsibilities between the state 
and the company. The state has a responsibility to regulate the sector, whereas the 
companies in the petroleum industry sustain operational activities (Norwegian Petroleum 
2019b). The idea behind the division of the roles is that if the state gives autonomy to the 
companies in the petroleum industry by setting a well-organized framework for 
operational activities, these companies will function for their benefit. Since society has a 
stake over gains from the petroleum industry in the country, society will gain from any 
                                                 
3 For the details of Equinor’s articles of association, please see: 
https://www.equinor.com/content/dam/statoil/documents/corporate-governance-equinor/equinor-asa-articles-of-
association%202018-05-15.pdf 
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policy for the benefit of the companies (Norwegian Petroleum 2019b). The Norwegian 
government sustains its regulations with directorates under six ministries, which are 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Ministry of Climate and Environment, Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Fisheries, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry of 
Transport and Communications and Ministry of Finance. In this system, with the 
legislative power, Storting acts as a supervisor over the government and sets a framework 
for the operations of the companies. Therefore, thre Norwegian state has been in the 
background in the governance of Equinor rather than being the authority over the 
company since the earlier years of its establishment. The limitation over the power of 
state in Equinor is empowered by the laws of Norway.  
 
 
5.2.2. Independent Variable  
 
Equinor builds its diversification in three ways; diversification of the type of operations, 
internationalization of the operations, and diversification of the ownership of the 
company. Unlike most national oil companies, Equinor started to diversify its operations 
only a few years after its establishment. In 1975, Equinor established its first refinery, 
Mongstad Refining, with the partnership of Norsk Hydro4 (Claes 2019). Although this 
was a step towards vertical integration, Equnior made its major move during the late 
1980s. The company acquired the shares of Hydro (30 percent of the total) in Mongstad 
and expanded the capacity of the refinery. Nevertheless, the expansion of Mongstad was 
extremely costly and lacking sufficient commercial returns. Therefore, the early attempt 
of Equinor to diversify its productions resulted in a failure, which is called the Mongstad 
Scandal (Ryggvik 2015). During the 1980s, Equinor also entered the retail sector of 
Scandinavia, Baltic Sea Region, and Ireland (Gordon and Stenvoll 2007).  
 
Due to the competition in the Norwegian Continental Shelf and the draining resources in 
the region, Statoil decided to increase the regional diversity of its operations during the 
early 1990s. The company internationalized its exploration and production of oil and gas 
in two ways; either partnering with other companies or solely operation. In 1990, Equinor 
partnered with BP to make exploration and production in Angola, Azerbaijan, China, and 
                                                 
4 Norsk Hydro is a Norwegian Aluminum and renewable energy company, which operates globally. Until October 
2007, merge with Statoil, the company was considerably active in an oil and gas industry. 
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Vietnam (Oil & Gas Journal 1991). In the meanwhile, Equinor started to solely operate 
in the U.S., Ireland, Iran, and Venezuela (Gordon and Stenvoll 2007).  
 
The first major transformation in the company happened in 2001 when Equinor was listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange. With the listing, the share of the Norwegian 
government fell to 81.7 percent. Equinor’s CEO of the time described the process as 
following: “The listing is a milestone for the group. We are now entering a new era” (The 
Wall Street Journal 2001). The initial listing was followed by public share offerings 
through which the share of the state fell to 70.9 percent. 
 
Following the privatization, Equinor increased its diversification both operationally and 
internationally. The company took its latest shape after its merge with Norsk Hydro in oil 
and gas operations in 2007. The deal was worth $30 billion, and as a result, the world’s 
largest offshore operator was established (Oil & Gas Journal 2007). After the merge of 
Equinor with Hydro’s oil and gas activities, the share of the Norwegian state in Equinor 
became 62.5 percent. However, the share was below the two thirds, the minimum share 
that the Norwegian state can hold according to the decision of Storting in 2001 (Equinor 
2019c). Therefore, in 2009, the share of the government in Equinor reached 67 percent. 
Today, other than the Norwegian government, Equinor has 19 more shareholders. The 
distribution of the private shareholders is as such; 11.52 percent Norwegian private 
shareholders, 8.49 percent rest of Europe, 7,18 percent the U.S., 5.77 percent the U.K., 
and 0.4 percent from rest of the world (Cnn Business 2019).  
 
In 2010, Equinor carried out an IPO of Statoil Fuel & Retail, gas station and fuel unit of 
the company. With the sale of 40 percent of its share in Statoil Fuel & Retail, Equinor 
decreased its share in the business related to service stations (Reuters 2010). Equinor sold 
the remaining shares of Statoil Fuel & Retail in 2012 to increase its investments in new 
energy, such as offshore wind, and solar energy (Financial Times 2012).  
 
Equinor entered into the renewable energy sector in 2009 by installing the first hywind 
demo in Norway (Wind Power Monthly 2011). Hywind is a floating wind turbine design, 
consisting of a giant wind turbine placed on top of a floating vertical spar. The company 
continued its wind power investments in the U.K. The first large-scale commercial 
offshore wind investment of the company, Sheringham Shoal (Equinor 40 percent 
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operator), started to produce in 2011, which produces enough clean energy to meet the 
energy need of 220,000 homes (BBC 2011). 
 
As part of its new energy solutions, Equinor established a corporate venture fund, Equinor 
Energy Ventures, in 2016 to invest in renewable energy companies. With its $200 million 
total investment capital, the fund is created to contribute to the low-carbon energy projects 
of Equinor (Bloomberg 2019b). 
 
In 2016, Equinor entered into Solar energy by signing an agreement with Scatec Solar to 
acquire 40 percent shares of Apodi Solar asset in Brazil. The project was planned to 
provide electricity to approximately 160,000 households. Equinor and Scate Solar agreed 
not only for the current project but also for future solar projects in Brazil (CNBC 2017).  
 
The wind farm investments of Equinor, on the other hand, continued with Hywind 
Scotland (Equinor 75 percent operator), which started production in 2017 and has the 
capacity to meet the energy need of 22,000 houses (The Guardian 2017). In the same 
year, Equinor established its second wind farm in the U.K, called Dudgeon (Equinor 35 
percent operator), which can produce energy enough to power around 410,000 houses 
(Energy Voice 2018). In 2019, Equinor expanded regional diversity of its wind farm 
projects and a new wind park, Arkona (Equinor 50 percent operator) with the capacity to 
supply the energy need of 400,000 houses, started production in Germany (DW 2019).  
 
As part of the operations of Equinor, the Norwegian government permitted to Equinor 
and its partners, Shell and Total, to build a large-scale offshore Carbon Capture and 
Storage projects (CCS) in 2017 to decrease the level of carbon emission (Reuters 2019d). 
CCS technology is used to capture carbon dioxide, transport and store it, mostly in the 
underground, to prevent the emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Equinor has 
already operational CCS projects since the1990s. 
 
In addition to already established wind farms, Equinor has two future wind farm projects. 
The company made an investment to develop Empire Wind Farm and Boardwalk Wind 
in the U.S. Empire Wind Farm and Boardwalk Wind will most likely have the capacity 
to supply the energy need of 2 million houses, which is more than the total of established 
wind farms of the company (Wind Power Monthly 2019). The last wind farm project of 
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Equinor is the Dogger Bank wind farm, which will be the most extensive offshore wind 
farm development in the world (Equinor 2019b). The farm is planned to supply the energy 
need of almost 5 million houses. Other than new projects, Equinor also agreed with 
Polenergia to acquire a 50 percent share of three wind farms in Poland, called Bałtyk I, II 
and III (Poland at Sea 2018). 
 
As a further step to become a broader energy company, rather than being only an oil and 
gas company, the company changed its name from Statoil to Equinor in 2018. The name 
change, however, does not indicate an immediate change in the portfolio of Equinor. 
According to the Annual Report (2018) of Equinor, the largest investments of the 
company are still on the development of oil and gas. As of 2019, the share of wind power 
constitutes five percent of Equinor’s annual investments. The share of wind power in 
annual income is not reported separately in the annual report. By 2030, Equnior plans to 
make 80-85 percent of its investments in oil and gas. The remaining 15-20 percent will 
constitute the company’s investments in low-carbon energy alternatives.  
 
Equinor sustains its oil and gas explorations and productions in 30 countries (Equinor 
2019d). As of 2018, the company has exploration licenses in 18 countries. Among these 
countries, in the U.S., Brazil, Canada, Angola, Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Azerbaijan, 
Ireland, Russia, and the U.K., Equinor already produces oil. The share of operations in 
these countries constitutes 39 percent of Equinor’s oil and gas production in 2018, and 
the net income of these operations constitutes 20 percent of the total income of the 
company (Equinor 2018). 
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Table 4. Major Diversification Attempts of Equinor 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3. Dependent Variable 
 
From the establishment of Equinor in 1972 to 2007, the board of directors of the company 
had been composed of Norwegian members. The first international members were elected 
in 2007, following the merge of the company with Norsk Hydro in the same year 
(StatoilHydro 2007). The first international members of Equinor were Roy Franklin and 
Kurt Anker Nielsen.  
 
Roy Franklin was first elected to the board in 2007 and served until 2013. In the 2015 
elections, he was re-elected, and he is still on the board of Equinor. Franklin worked for 
BP, Paladin Resources, and Clyde Petroleum. Besides his executive roles, he has also 
served on the board of several oil and gas companies, namely, Premier Oil, Cuadrilla 
Resources Holding, and Energean Israel. Besides, Franklin is a part of the boards of 
Kerogen Capital, an equity firm, and Wood plc, an energy company (Equinor 2018). 
Considering that he has other directorships in the past, R. Franklin appears to be a well-
recognized figure in the global oil and gas industry. In addition to his reputation, his 
experience in BP for almost 18 years is worth to mention in understanding his role in the 
board of Equinor. BP is one of the major partners of Equinor in its international 
Diversification in the Company Year
Establishment of Mongstad 1975
Privation of the company 2001
The merge with the Hydro Norsk 2007
The first Wind Power project 2011
The first Solar Power project 2016
The name change from Statoil to Equinor 2018
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operations, for instance, in the offshore drilling operations in Brazil. Therefore, the 
experience of Roy Franklin on the board may give a positive signal for relations with BP.  
 
The second international member appointed to the board of Equinor in 2007 was Kurt 
Anker Nielsen. Hydro’s election committee recommended Nielsen to the 2007 elections 
of Equinor’s board (Equinor 2007). He was also a member of the board of Hydro. Nielson 
has held senior management positions in Novo and Novo Nordisk, which are healthcare 
companies, in Denmark (StatoilHydro 2007). Although he served on the board of several 
companies, he had no oil and gas experience other than Equinor.  
 
In 2009, Kurt Anker Nielsen was replaced by Jakob Stausholm (Statoil 2009). He held 
several managerial positions in Shell for 18 years. His experience at Shell is noteworthy 
because Shell is one of the partners of Equinor in its international oil exploration and also 
in the carbon capture storage investments (Offshore Energy Today 2016). Stausholm 
served on the board of Equinor as a shareholder representative until late 2016. After he 
was appointed as  CFO of the Maersk Group, he resigned from the board of Equinor to 
prevent any conflict of interest (Offshore Energy Today 2016).  
 
In 2010, the number of international members on the board of Equinor rose to three, and 
Lady Barbara Judge was elected as the new member. She holds American and British 
citizenships. Lady Judge is a prominent figure for both the U.S. and the U.K. She held 
critical positions in the U.K. She was the executive chair of the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority, deputy chair of the Financial Council of the U.K. On the other hand, she 
became the youngest person ever appointed by the president of the United States to the 
position of commissioner, U.S. Securities, and Exchange Commission (Independent 
2018b). BBC Radio Four’s Woman’s Hour describes her as “one of the best-connected 
women in Britain” (The Guardian 2018a). Her power in the U.K. could be a facilitative 
factor for Equinor in increasing its operations in the U.K., especially in wind power after 
2011.  
 
In 2012, the number of international board members of Equinor increased to four. As a 
result of the increase, Maria Johanna Oudeman was elected as a shareholder 
representative to the board (Statoil 2012). She was a member of the executive committee 
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of Akzo Nobel, the world's largest paint and coatings company and a major producer of 
specialty chemicals, with operations in more than 80 countries. 
 
In 2013, Roy Franklin and Lady Barbara Judge left the board, and two new international 
members were elected as shareholder representatives; James Mulva and Catherina 
Hughes (Statoil 2013). James Mulva was a former President and the CEO of 
ConocoPhilips and Philips Petroleum (Reuters 2015). Catherina Hughes worked for 
Schlumberger Oilfields company for 20 years in different parts of the world. She holds 
Canadian and British citizenships. In 2015, Mrs. Hughes resigned from the board of 
Equinor with the excuse that her upcoming marriage would create a conflict of interest 
(Market Watch 2015). After her resignation, the number of international members fell to 
three, and this number did not increase until 2018.  
 
In 2016, after the resignation of Jakob Stausham, Jeroen van der Veer was elected as a 
shareholder representative member. The entire experience of Van der Veer is in Royal 
Dutch Shell. From 1971 to 2009 he worked for Shell in several positions (LNG World 
News 2016). Eventually, he retired as the CEO of Shell. Van der Veer is still on the board 
of Equinor. Van der Veer is a proponent of moving from fossil fuels to renewables. In 
describing his vision of the energy future, he focuses on three pillars: energy savings, 
natural gas and the increased use of low-carbon or zero-carbon electricity. 
 
“First, the world is still not doing enough to save energy. Second, for large 
parts of the world, natural gas is the best transition fuel, as it is widely 
available, and a lot of infrastructure has been created for it. It’s not perfectly 
clean, but it scores very reasonably on greenhouse gas emissions and on water 
footprint. Thirdly, as the world is using more and more electricity, we need 
to develop renewable energies that are much cheaper than they are today. This 
means we need to develop new technologies first and then build large-scale 
projects.” (Energypost.eu 2016) 
 
In 2018, the number of international board members increased to four (Equinor 2018). 
Maria Johanna Oudeman left the board, and two new members were elected instead. The 
increase in the number of international members took place after the name change of 
Equinor. Anne Drinkwater is one of the new elected international members. A. 
Drinkwater’s entire experience was in BP. Besides that, she has served as a board member 
of Aker Solutions, which is an engineering firm producing systems required to unlock 
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energy generated from oil, gas, and offshore wind (Equinor 2018).  Thereby, Equinor had 
its first board member having an experience in offshore wind. The last international board 
member, who was elected at the same time with Drinkwater, is Jonathan Lewis. He has 
several experiences in engineering and construction companies, such as Capita and Amec 
Foster Wheeler (Equinor 2018).  
 
Table 5. The Change in the Number of Intl. Board Members of Equinor 
 
 
Period Number of Board Members Number of Intl Board Members Ratio of Intl Members 
2007-2010 10 2 20%
2010-2012 10 3 30%
2012-2015 10 4 40%
2015-2018 10 3 30%
2018-Present 11 4 36%
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5.3. Analysis of Findings 
 
 
The individual case analyses of Saudi Aramco and Equinor starts by indicating that the 
companies differentiate from each other in terms of both state-level variables and firm-
level variables. While the regime in Saudi Arabia, the home country of Saudi Aramco, is 
an absolute monarchy, Norway, the home country of Equinor, is ruled via democracy. 
Due to the geographic features of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Aramco sustains its oil exploration 
and production in the onshore, whereas Equinor’s oil exploration and production takes 
place mostly in the offshore since the hydrocarbon reserves of Norway are found in the 
continental shelf of the country. Due to its geographic location, the operations of Saudi 
Aramco are under high political risks, whereas Equinor operates in quite stable regions 
compared to Saudi Aramco. Another difference between these two companies is the time 
of their establishment. Saudi Aramco was founded around the same time with the 
foundation of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the new state was created based on petroleum in 
the country. On the other hand, in Norway, petroleum was found long after the foundation 
of the state. In other words, when oil was discovered in the country, Norway had already 
well-established institutions.  
 
The differences between Saudi Aramco and Equinor are not only limited to the features 
of their home countries. They differentiate from each other regarding the features of the 
firms. The first difference is the initial cultures of these companies. Saudi Aramco was 
created as an international oil company by some of the oil majors, and the company was 
nationalized almost 50 years after its establishment. Equinor, however, was created as a 
100 percent government-owned company and was privatized in 2001. Related to the 
variation in the ownership structure of Saudi Aramco and Equinor, these two companies 
have different authorities in their management. In Saudi Aramco, the Saudi state is the 
authority over the firm, whereas, in Equinor, shareholders have the power over the 
company.  
 
These variables provide sufficient evidence that Saudi Aramco and Equinor are least 
likely cases. Therefore, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables 
can be measured by eliminating the effect of these variables. The next step measures the 
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change in the diversification in the companies and the change in their international board 
members.  
 
The first major attempt of Saudi Aramco to diversify its operations was taken in 1989. 
The company created the Motiva refinery with Texaco and Shell as the first step towards 
being a vertically integrated company. During the same year, Saudi Aramco restructured 
its board, replaced most of its international members with Saudi members with the effect 
of nationalization. However, the company kept three international members on the board. 
Clifton C. Garvin and Harold J. Haynes, two of these three members, were the former 
chairman and CEO of Exxon and Chevron Corporation. These two companies were 
among the major oil companies, and were also former shareholders of Saudi Aramco. The 
appointment of the two top figures from these companies even during the early times of 
the nationalization was an indicator of the intention of Saudi Aramco to keep international 
experience on its board.  
 
Saudi Aramco continued its investments in refinery domestically and internationally. The 
major step of the time to diversify its operations was the acquisition of the interests in 
Samarec in 1993. With the purchase of Samarec, Saudi Aramco took over the refineries 
under the company and increased its partnership with major oil companies. Considering 
the early partnerships of Saudi Aramco, in this new era, the relations with partners gained 
more importance. A few years after the purchase of Samarec, Saudi Aramco made a 
change in its board and appointed James W. Kinnear as a new international member. 
Kinnear was the former Chairman and CEO of Texaco, one of the major partners of Saudi 
Aramco. Besides, he was known with his principle to restore relations and build a positive 
image to the outside.  
 
Another significant development for Saudi Aramco was the entrance of the company into 
the petrochemical industry. In 2005, Saudi Aramco entered in petrochemical business by 
creating a joint venture, Petro Rabigh. Throughout the 2000s, Saudi Aramco increased its 
share in petrochemicals, especially creating integrated petrochemical joint ventures. 
Simultaneously, Saudi Aramco made a change in its board and appointed two new 
international members. One of these appointees, Mark Moody Stuart, was the former 
Chairman of Shell, one of the major partners of Saudi Aramco. Besides, he is quite a 
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proponent of diversification and partnerships, which was gaining more importance for 
Saudi Aramco.  
 
Saudi Aramco sustained its policy of diversifying its operations through petrochemical 
investments. In 2011, the company created Sadara petrochemicals joint venture with Dow 
Chemicals. Related to its partnership with Dow Chemicals, Saudi Aramco appointed 
Andrew N. Liweris, former Chairman and CEO of Dow Chemicals, to its board. Liweris 
was also known for his close ties with the Saudi government. He initiated several 
investments in the country.  
 
The most significant diversification attempt of Saudi Aramco caused the biggest change 
in the board of Saudi Aramco. After the announcement of the IPO in 2016, Saudi Aramco 
increased the number of international members from three to five in 2018. The new 
figures appointed to the board are experienced executives on mostly petrochemicals. The 
increasing weight of members with petrochemicals background helped the company to 
increase its operations in petrochemicals. Evidently, Saudi Aramco bought the shares in 
Sabic, the biggest petrochemical company of Saudi Arabia, in 2019.  
 
As in Saudi Aramco, changes in the board of Equinor has proceeded parallel to the 
changes in its operations and structure of the company. Although Equinor was privatized 
in 2001, the major change in the company took place with its merge with Norsk Hydro in 
2007. The merge created a need to represent the shareholders on the board and also a need 
to have a more diverse board structure. Therefore, in 2007, two international members 
were elected to the board of Equinor. One of the members was elected as the shareholder 
representative.  
 
Another major attempt of diversification made by Equinor was when the company 
entered into renewable energy in 2011 with investments in the U.K. to wind power 
tribunes. As the diversity in the operations of Equinor increased, the numbers of 
international members on the board increased in two subsequent election terms. While 
the number was two, it increased to three in 2010 and four in 2012.  
 
However, in 2015, following the resignation of one of the international members, the 
number fell back to three. There is no empirical evidence on its relationship with the 
 70 
board change, but 2015 became the first year that Equinor released loss. In 2018, the 
company changed its name from Statoil to Equinor, to better reflect the diversity in its 
operations. With this change, the number of international board members went back to 
four. Besides, Equinor elected its first international member with experience in 
renewables.  
 
The analysis of the relationship between the diversity of the operations and the 
international board members indicated two things. As the government is the only owner 
of the company, Saudi Aramco does not hold any shareholder representatives. Besides, 
all the members are directly appointed to the board. Therefore, the identity of the 
international members plays a significant role in their appointment. As seen in the 
findings, Saudi Aramco has appointed international members who are directly related to 
the priorities of the company at the time. In other words, the international appointments 
made to Saudi Aramco’s board reflect the policy direction of the company at the time.  
 
In Equinor, the system does not work as in Saudi Aramco. The first international member 
of the company was elected after the privatization of the company. Therefore, most 
international board members were elected as shareholder representatives. Unlike Saudi 
Aramco, these members are not directly appointed. Instead, they are elected by several 
bodies of the company. As seen in the analysis, due to the structural difference between 
these two companies, in Equinor, what reflects the change in the diversity in the company 
is the change in the number of international members. However, in Saudi Aramco the 
specific characteristics of the members also matter. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Deriving from the increasing needs of NOCs to be more integrated into the global oil 
market, this thesis aimed to test the hypothesis that there is a positive relation between 
the level of integration of NOCs into the global market and the presence of international 
members on their boards. The literature on the position of SOEs in the global market, the 
position of NOCs in the energy market, the role of corporate governance, specifically, the 
of board directors in the management of companies, created the basis for the research 
question of this thesis.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the literature on NOCs provides enough evidence to argue that 
NOCs perform poorer than IOCs, and that NOCs are less integrated into the market than 
IOCs. Therefore, the increase in the diversity of a company to become more integrated 
into the global market is the independent variable of this thesis. The literature evidently 
indicates that a well-functioning corporate governance structure is directly related to a 
company’s integration into the market. By corporate governance structure, what is meant 
is generally the board of directors of companies. The literature on the performance of 
companies demonstrates that the diversity of board composition in terms of nationality is 
one of the factors that increases the performance of the board. Therefore, the change in 
the international board members of NOCs is the dependent variable. 
 
In order to observe the relationship between the change in the level of integration of 
NOCs into the global market and the change in the international board members of these 
NOCs, the Most Different System Design is used in this thesis. The two most different 
NOCs with international members on their board, Saudi Aramco and Equinor, constituted 
the cases in the thesis. When comparing the two, by checking the selected control 
variables, the effect of all other variables in Saudi Aramco and Equinor were eliminated 
as much as possible. 
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As a result of the analysis, in both cases, a direct relationship between the diversity in the 
operations and the international board members are observed. However, the extent to how 
the board of directors reflects this change varied. In Saudi Aramco, the change in the 
diversity of the operations mainly affects the past experiences of who will be appointed 
as an international member. Saudi Aramco generally appointed international members 
considering their previous companies, perspective, and their expertise in the area that the 
company was trying to develop itself in. However, this was not the only change observed 
in international members. The company also changed the number of its international 
members when it decided to diversify its ownership structure.  
 
The board of Equnior reflects the relation between the diversity in the operations and 
international board members mostly through the number of international members. 
Starting from the diversification of the ownership structure, the number of international 
members has increased in most of the company’s major diversification attempts. The only 
change in the board that broke this pattern was in 2015, when the number of international 
members fell from four to three, despite the increase in the diversity in the operations of 
the company. Therefore, although the analysis indicates a correlation between the 
independent and the dependent variables, there can be other variables that cause an 
unexpected decline in the number of international board members of Equinor.  
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